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CHAPTER 1»
lîJTERTEOTIOH

Iran9 oommonly known aa tho "gateway to Indla^" Ilea
•
_
between India and East Asia on one hand and the Hear East
and the Western World on the other« It is a small state
A

A

of 6289O6O square miles and of approximately 15,000,(X)0
people#

Compared to modem progressive states of Europe

and North America» it is socially and eccviomically back
ward#

But it has the richest oil field in existence and

is the fourth largest oil producing country in the world.
Because Iran has this abundance of oil, it has become
with the advent of the mechanical age a focal p&int of
f

*

the policies of two interested great powers, Russia (now
the Soviet Union) and Great Britain#
not bring these two powers into Iran.

But oil alone did
Since the rise of

Muscovite Russia, the Russian statd has tried to obtain
an outlet on an open sea, and the Russian advance to the
south had as its objective the Persian Gulf#

Commercial

and economic interests along with military interests brought
the Russian to Iran, or as it was then known, Persia#
The Russian advance to the south also followed the policy
of empire-building or natural esqjansion which brought the
Russians into conflict with another empire-building people.

^ ^

tho British#
Tho British esmo to Persia first as a maritime power
io the poasessloa of a £^reat Indiam empire, tho protection
of which vas a paramount British interest#

It was the

necessity to defend India from any power that might gain
control of tho weak Persian state that attracted Britain**
attention to tho Persian area# And in the course of their
own imperial expansion, the British were not unaware of
i

tho possibility of exploiting Persia and developing there
a British sphere of interest# A sharply contrasted rivalry
between Russia and Great Britain developed in the nineteenth
century in econtxnic, commercial and political affairs#

Their

imperial interests collided in many places in Europe and
Asia, and their rivalty in Persia was an integral part
of the ccxiflict#

with the dawn of a new century, however, the European
and world situation had so altered that in 1907 a great,
change oocured in the relations of Russia and Great Britain
over Persia.
One of the more important reasons for Russia**
acquiescence to a rapprochement with Great Britain was the
end of the League of Three Emperors (Russia, Germany, and
Austria) in 1887 because of the Austro-Russian split over
the Balkans and Germany** support of Austria in this area.
The alliance between Germany and Russia continued for three

**

3

more years, tut the unreliable character of the alliance
forced Alexander III to seek other allies*

This prepared

the ground for a Franoo-^Husslan imderstending which even
tually ^suited In the Franco-Russlan alliance of 1895»
And after Russians defeat in the Japanese war and the result
ing weakening of Russia** military prestige In the East,
Ruaso-Brltish relations took on a more favorable character*
Great Britain, at the same time, also had Important
reasons for desiring a rapprochement with Russia* With
the growth of German power in the Near East Great Britain
came to fear Germany more than It did Russia*

Finding

Itself al«3e and without friends In the Boer War, because
of a policy of "Splendid Isolation,* Great Britain in 1902

signed a treaty of alliance with Japan*

In 1905 it entered

into the Entente Cordiale with France and then sought
friendship with France’s ally, Russia*
Such being the state of affairs, the two powers reached
an accord known as the Anglo^Ruasion, or the Grey-Iswolsky,
agreement oh August 31, 1907# The agreement, signed in
Id W# Henry Cooke and Edith P* Stickney, Read inrs in

European International Relations Since IG79. Harper and
Brothers, New York, 1931, pp* 12&.130.
See appendix, p&ge iSJfor complete text of treaty*

^ 4 *

St, f*t@r8bur& 'tj the Brltlfih ambassador. Sir Arthur
Rloolson, and the Russian minister of foreign affairs*
Alexander Iswolsky, was composed of tliree sections relating
to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet.
With reference to Persia, both Great Britain and
Russia promised to respect the Integrity and independence
of Persia#

Trade opportunities would be equal for all

nations# After the statement of these two principles for
the sake of appearances. Great Britain and Russia divided
Persia into three zonest the northern portion to be under
Russian influence, the southern portion to be in the British
os^ere ofr,Influence, and

a

neutral zone to be in the center

between the two spheres of Influence#

The agreement also

dealt with the Russian Discount and Loan Bank and the
British Imperial Bank and set the policies they should follow
Generally speaking, this agreement was accepted in
Europe as of being of great Inportance, because It sub-#
stltuted friendly relations for better rivalry between the
two great Asiatic powers. However, according to the Russian
2# Alexander P# lewolsky, (1856-1919) entered the foreign
office under Prince Gorchakov, and was appointed successively
to diplomatic posts at Bucharest, Washington, the Vatican,
Belegrade, Munich, Tokyo and Copenhagen, He was appointed
minister for foreign affaire In 1906, and In 1910 was made
Russian ambassador to Paris#
3# Sir Arthur Hloolson, (1849-1928) was a diplomatic ambassad
to Madrid, 1904-06, and In St. Petersburg, 1906-10# Ke con
cluded negotiations leading to ihe Algegiras conference in
1906, and the entente with France and Russia In 1907*

* 5

4
minister of finance. Count Witte, the older Russian
statesmen were not hapjpy about the eg-reement:
The agreement was a triumph of British
diplomacy# It dealt chiefly with Persia# The
Northern part of that country, which Includes
Its most fertile and thickly populated sections,
had from times Immemorial been within our sphere
of Influence# With the conquest of the Southern
parts of the Caucasus, formerly provinces of
Persia and Turkey, the Northern part of Persia
was naturally destined,-so to speak, to become
& part of the Russian Empire# To prepare that
eventuality wer sacrificed a great deal of our
blood and treasure# The agreement set all these
sacrifices at naught# according to It^ Southern
Persia was to be under the eooncmlo influence of
Great Britain, while the North was left to us#
As for Persia 8 oontral Government, It was to
be owatrolled.by Russia and Great Britain acting
jointly# Since Tehran, the eeat of the Central
Government, is situated In the North this meant
British influence In the North as well aa in the
South#5
The British seemed well satisfied with the agreement,
because Great Britain was unprepared to maintain Its position
in Persia by either $oney or force, and the terras secured
were In all probability as good as could be obtained* Since
the agreement was made purely between Russia and Great
Britain and ostensibly to arrange questions concerning
their respective ^interests,** Persia had nothing to do with
It, either directly or In any manner*
4# Count Sergius Vittc, (1849-^1915) became minister of
waya of communication In 1892, and August the same year
became minister of finance# In I&96 he became sec
retary of state, and In I899 was actual privy councillor#
Ré was responsible for the Portsmouth treaty in 1905#
5# Count Witte, The Memoiaa of tfounÿ Witte# (Translated from
the original Russian manuscript and edited by Abraham
lamollnaky). Garden City, N#Y.% Doubleday end Page, 1925, p.

5

While the Russian* and the British promised faith
fully to "respeot the integrity and Independence of Persia,**
j

this was not the case#

»

The period between 1907 and World

War I, in so far as Persia was concerned, was a period of
continuous intervention on the part of both the British
and the Russians*

ÏXirlng World War I, Persia declared its

neutrality, but was too weak to prevent Russian, British,
and Turkish armies from violating its territory*
For all practical purposes, the treaty of 19OT lapsed
ten years later, in 191?» when the Bolsheviki came to
power in Russia and upset the former balance of interests
in Persia*

Great Britain poured troops into Persia, and

its officiels became virtual controllers of the country*
British policy then centered around a new Anglo-Perslan
agreement in which Great Britain practically took the govern
ment of the Shah under its protection end established a
British protectorate in fact if not in name* But this
agreement came to naught when the Bolshevist landing at
Enzeli in August 1919 undermined Persian confidence in
6
British capacity to defend Persian interests*
Because Bolshevik doctrines were contrary to the
traditions and the religion Of Persia, the attitude of the
6* K*X. McCarthy, Anrlo-Russian Rivalry In Persia. The
Univeraity of Buffalo Studies, Vol* XV*, June 1925, Pub
lished under the direction of the committee of publications,
of the Boswell Park Publication Fund, p* 64,

7 t

Persian government toward Bolshevism was hostile* However#
7,
Bolshevik policy aa stated by Georshy Chloherln (Soviet
foreign minister) In in appeal to the workers and peaaanta
of Persia va» warmly received* He denounced the AngloPersian agreement and gave the Soviet Cnloa’a pledge that
#11 the Taarist treaties whion had "enslaved*^ Persia wer§
null and void* The Persian government was fully avare of
the danger that Bolshevism presented » but It nevertheless
wished to maintain good relations with Soviet authorities
In order to play them off against the British*

Aa a result

of Soviet policy andoof Persian aspirations^ a treaty of
friendship was signed ZWtween the two oouotries at l^oecov
ca February 26# "1921# and ratifications were exchanged at
G
Tehran m February 26# 1922*
In this treaty of 1921# the ^vlet government statedî
«♦.deairing that the Persian people should be
happy aad Independent and should be able to
dispose freely of its patrimony# the Russian
Republic declares the whole body of treaties and
conventions concluded with Persia by the Tsarist
Government# which crushed the rights of the
Persian people# to be null and void*?
7* Georghy 7# ChicherIn# (1872-1936) was appointed peoples
cocamlBsar for foreign affairs la &larcb 1918. In 1922 he
headed the Soviet delegation to the conference at Genoa*
He conducted Soviet policy froq) 1918-30, having a longer
tenure of office than any contemporary European foreign
minister*
8* Compilation of Documents, prepared by the representative
of Iran# for the convenient reference in the Consideration
by the Security Council of the disputes between Iran and
the bnlon of Soviet Socialist Republics# pp. 21-27. Dee
appendix# page try for ooaplete text of treaty*
9* jCbId** P* 21*

- 8

To this end* all loan# tO Persia were cancelled, and the
property of the Bank of Persia was traasfejprad to Persia#
The Persian:eovM/v/Wffvt on It# part promised not to hand over
to any third state or it# citizens the concessions surren-»
dared Vj the Soviets#

If a third party interfered la the

internal affairs of Persia, the Soviet# also reserved the
ri^ht to intervene
in Persian internal affairs#
I»

This treaty

was to become an important factor in the events to follow
thirty years later#
10
Again in 1927 the Soviet Union and Iran felt the need
11

for a treaty# This treaty was one of eacoifity and neutrality
and in part restated the obligations of the 19^ treaty#
The Soviet Union promised not to interfere in Persian
affairs unless a third party threatened Persian integrity,
r

and the two ccmtracting parties foreswore aggressive acts
against the other# All issues between the two powers were to
be settled peacefully# The treaty was to last for three
years, to be renewed every year thereafter unless one of
the parties gave notice of its denunciation#
XI

During the years that followed the signing of the
^curlty and neutrality treaty, Iran’s foreign relation#
10# In 1935, Hisa Shah changed the official name of Persia
to Iran#
11# Coaoilation of Document#, prepared by the representative
of Iran, pp# 16-18#

-

9

-

wei*# faors or le«a uneventful. The Soviet Union was enea6®<l
In reconBtruotlon, Genaany had lost her position aa a E^r^at
power, and Hazlsi^ vas not yet taken seriously.

However,

Iran did become involved in a dispute with Great Britain
la 1930 over the coneeoslon of the ^nslo^Persian Oil Company*
a oonoesslon that had been acquired in 1914 with the assistance
12

Of Winston Churohlll. pie Iranian government threatened
nationalization unless it received greater roysllties fraa
the Oil Company.

Iran wOa its case and the ooncesaion was
13
renewed under conditions very favorable for Iran. In 1919,
Iran became a member,of the League of Nations,and in 1937
it was elected a non-permanent member of the League CoupeH.
In 1941, however, Iran became involved in World,War II,

because the Allies could not tolerate things the way they,
we e in Iran.

Since the Iranian oil fields were so impor*

tant for the British fleet, the pro-Nazi Shah could not be
left on the throne. The country also had a strong German
Tfifth oolican,** and the government did very little to dis
courage it. Because it needed Iran for a base to receive
supplies from its allies, the Soviet Union declared that
the presence of so many German agents threatened the exle12# Winston 3. Churchill, (1874J had an army background
and became an %,?* in 1900. He was first lord of the
admirality and minister for national defence. He has been
leader of the conservative party since Hay 1945.
13# United Nations Hews. Vol. I.,
Wilson Foundation, ^#1., p. 3*

5., May 1946, Woodrow

- !S-

tenc«)W Ita "life line," Therefore, In Au^uai, 1941, the
•1'f- K
Ï
nulsE o c a u p l e < 3.the-nort^ra provinces, and the Brltlsli
oocupld<i\thè Bouthem recio»* The Shah vae deposed, and
hlfl Boht. îîûhssraed Rlza Pahlevl, vaa placed on the throne*
Irah>dld not beooae ft bettle field, aa In World War I,
*
i "'N
"
nor wae; It expected to Join in the military actions of the
’
i
var* It/^aa, however, obllsod to co-operate fnXly with the
I
*
Ailles In every other way. In order to ^Ivo full scope
to this Co-oporation. In September, 1943, Iran declared war
on dormanyj ' Ae a consequence, all Germans who had not
I

succeeded In leaving the countiy were arrested and taken
either to Russia or touBrltlah India.

On 2îarch 2, 1945,

Iran declared war can Japan.
To confirm and to define the new situation, a "Tri
partite Treaty of Alliance" was concluded In Tehran on
January 29, 1942 among the United Klngdcxs, the Soviet Union
15
and Iran. In this agreement, unlike the 1907 agreement,
iran was accepted on an equal footing with the other contraoting parties. Again as in the 1907 agreement. Great
Britain and the Soviet Union undertook to "respect the
14. nohaanad Rlza Pahlevl, (1919) was "vallalld"
(Crown Prince)^ heir apparent tc the throne.of Iran..
He succeeded to the throne on the abdication of his
father in 1941.
,15# Security Counc11 Official Records. First Year, First
Series, Supplement Ho. 1., J.iurdh House, Westminster,
London, pp. 43-45. See Appendix, page 162 for complete
text of Treaty,

-11

territorial laterrlty^ the sovereignty and polltloal+jjadepen'
15
<3ence of Iran." The Iranian government agreed to place
transport and oommunloatlon faollltlee at the disposal of
the Allied ÿovere.

It vas also specifically provided that

"the assistance of the Iranian forces shall# however# he
limited to the maintenance of Internal security of Iranian
17
territory# The Allied powers could maintain armed forces
on Iranian territory# and these forces end Iranian authorItiea were to co-operate In settling their difficulties.
An Important part of the treaty (later to come before

the United Nations Security Council) was Article 5» which
required the forces of the Allied powers to be withdrawn
from Iranian territory not later than "six months after

the cessation of hostilities" between the Allied powers
18
and Germany and its associates* The Allied powers were to
consult with the Iranian government on all matters that
pertained directly to Iran# and they were to safeguard the
economic Existence of the Iranian people against the pri
vations and difficulties brought on by the war*
The same spirit was to be found In the text of the
thfee-power declaration concerning Iran# made at the Tehran
16* Ibid.. p. A4.
17# XbId. « P# A4*
18.

p. 45.

-

12

*

19
conference, Deoenber 1, 1993# la this declaration the
epeolal economic difficulties that the war had caused for
Iran were recocnlsed, and the 2I5 Three (U.S.A., U.S.S.R.*
and Great Britain) promised to Give Iran all the economic
assistance they could In ll^ht of the heavy demanda made
on them by the war* The pledge to guarantee the Independence,
sovereignty end territorial Integrity of Iran In accordance
with the principles of the Atlantic Charter was resteted*
111
These expressions of non-intervention and good will
were not carried out In practice, however, and the occupation
caused unrest among the ooamon people of Iran*

Following

the occupation, a bad harvest, sad the oocup^ng trocps,
especially the Russians who took over the available supply
20
of food. Caused a famine* In addition, the Iranians had
to contend with Inflation and the disruption of transportation
resulting from the presence of forelgi troops* To complicate
the situation. In October and November, 1944, the Soviets
demanded oil concessions In Iran* The Soviets had been pros
pecting for oil before the war In northern Iran, partlcularily
19. Ibid.. pp. 49-50. See Appendix, page 166 for complete
text of treaty.
20. William S. Hass, Iron. Columbia University freas, N.Y.,
1946, p. 226.

In ^lazanderan, and after the occupation had begun, they
21
began to drill in the occupied zone. At the same time,
American and British oil concerns were also demanding that
the Iranian government give them oil concessions*

On Nov

ember 2, 1944^ however, the Iranian government decided not
to give any new oil concessions after the war.

Four reasons

were given for doing this;
First, the Iranien public poinion would
consider any concession as having been granted'
under duress as long as foreign troops were in
Iran; second, the economic condition of the world
was not clear; third, the Washington oil conference
had left the situation in doubt; and fourth, all
reports froa Iranian representatives abroad had
urged that no concessions be granted during the
occupâtion*22

Criticizing the Iranian government for its refusal to
grant the oil concession, the Soviet Union alleged that thé
Iranian government favored the United States and Great
23
Britain, The Soviet government also questioned the presence
of United States troops in Iran, since the United States
had not been a party to the tri-partite agreement.

This

in spite of the fact that United States troops had been
stationed In Iran to insure the delivery of goods to the
Soviet Uhion. With the arrival of these American trobps,
21* Ibid,, p, 238*
?2, New York Tjmes. November 2, 1944*
23# Hass, Ir^n, p. 239.

Iran bad become the only place In the world where the
Big Three had troops In the same country.

As early as

November 1944, Iran was looked upon as a proving ground for
the United Nations and as a test of Big Three unity In the
postwar world*.
But Big Three unity and Sovtet-'lranlan relations were
weakened In November, 1945 when a rebellion occured In the
province of Azerbaijan, an Iranian province on the Soviet
border and therefore open to Soviet Influence*

Before the

outbreak of the rebellion, Soviet military and civil auth
orities in the northern provinces of Iran and particularly
In Azerbaijan, had encouraged and supported turbulent elements
24
In their opposition to the Tehran government, Soviet occupation
forces now openly hindered Iranian authorities frcaa exercising
i

their legitimate duties* A military occupation was also
established In the northern provinces contrary to Article 4,
paragraph 1, of the trl-partlte treaty which stated that
the presence of Allied forces on Iranian territory should
not constitute a military occupation.

Soviet authorities

also encouraged an autonomy movement In Azerbaijan, and the
Iranian government claimed that agents employed by Soviet
authorities to carry out the autonomy movement and rebellion
24l Security Council Official Records. First Year, First
Series, Supplement No* 1,, pp* 27-29.

were Soviet citizens of mixed origin who could pass as
Azerbaijanians.
At the outbreak of the rebellion, the Iranian govern
ment dispatched reinforcements to Azeib^aljan to help the
small Iranian continent of troops in the northern provinces,
but these troops were stopped at Shertf-Abad (80 miles from
Tehran) by Soviet army authorities and were not allowed to
25
proceed to theIk destination* The Soviet government explained
that the Iranian troops were halted, because, if they were to
proceed to Azerbaijan, th^re would have been much useless
rioting and bloodshed.
The consequence of this intervention by Soviet troops
was to place the rebels,in a position'successfully to intim
idate the civilian population and the Iranian officials in
Azerbaijan.

All relations with the central govemrAunt were

severed, and the rebels proclaimed the autonomy of the dis
tricts under their control* They besieged the army garrisons
stationed in different towns of Azerbaijan, forced them to
surrender, and disarmed them.

Government offices and rail

roads were captured, and an illegal government was established
in Tabriz, capital of Azerbaijan, in defiance of the constitutloi
Of Iran and the central government. A legislative assembly
1
was convened to which only official candidates of the rebels
26
were elected.
25. IMi.# p. 29.
26* Ibid.. p* 29.

—

—■

The Soviet Union at no time conoealed Its support of
the Insurgents*

Propaganda supporting the Insurgents flowed

out of the Soviet Union*

A Soviet consul attended* In his

official capacity* the opening session of the Insurgent
I

H

aasemhly at Tabriz*
By diplomatic, notes* the Iranian government appealed
to both the United States and Great Britain to persuadé
• r-

the U,3*8,R* to end its Intervention In Iran*

Since the

United States decided to support Iran*s case* on November
27
24* 1945 Its ambassador In Moscow* Averell Karrlman*
deliv
ered a note to the Soviet govemment concerning the situation
28
In Iran# In this note* It was stated that the Iranian gov-*
emment had informed the United States government that an
armed uprising had taken place In areas of northern Iran
where, Soviet troops had been stationed and that Iranian
troops had been stopped on their way to Azerbaijan*

Con*

sequently* the Iranian government could not carry out its
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order on
Iranian territory*

To reprove the U*S#8* ^ for Its conduct

ft

27* William Averell Harrlman* {1891-^
) was the présidantes
special representative and minister to Great Britain, land headed the mission to Moscow In 1941* He was ambassador to
the U.S.S.R*, 1943-45*
28# Security Counc11 Official Recorda^ First Year* First
Series* Supplement, No* 1.* pp. 53-55*

-

17

^

In thlB Instance, the Tehran declaration vaa included to
remind the Soviet Dnion of its pledges concerning Iran# If
the Soviet authorities vho had stopped the Iranian forces
had acted without instructions^ it was expected hj the
United States that the Soviet government would "Issue them
orders In keeping with the Tehran Ifeclaratlon" and that the
29
Iranian forces he allowed to pass. In conclusion the nate
stated)^
nations such aa Iran were encouraged at the
United Nations Conference at San Francisco to
place full trust In the friendly Intentions,and
good will of the permanent members of the. Security.
Council# The Government of the United States Is
confident that the Soviet Union and Great Britain
are no less anxious than the United States; In
dealing with nations such as Iran# to follow a
line of aotlofi which will make It clear that the
trust of these nations in the permanent members
of the Security Council has not been misplaced.
Similar prooosala are being made to the British
Government#30
3X
On November 27# 1945# Sir Archibald Clark Kerr,
32
British ambassador to the U*S.,S.R.# handed Vyacheslav Molotov#
29# mid#, p.^ 54.
30. Ibid., P., 55»
31» Archibald Clark Kerr entered the diplomatic service In
1906# and was envoy extraordinary and minister plenlpoten^
tlary to the Central toerlcaa Republics, 1925-28: to Chile,
I928-3O; to Sweden, 1931*"35^«. He was ambassador to Baghdad,
1935-39) to China, 1939^42; to the U.S.S.R» 1942-45; and
to the United States 1946-48. he was created Lord Inverchapel in 1946.
.

}

*

32* Vyacheslav M. Molotov {I890) was a member of the
Bolshevik party and served in the commun 1st revolutionary
government in 1917. Ke has been secretary of the central
committee of the communist party since 1921, sndVao
minister of foreign affairs, 1939-46.

«

JLO

—

the Soviet minister for foreign affairs, a #ote that followed
33
quite closely the note cent by the United States.
The Soviet government replied to the United States
note on November 291 1945#

The note stated that according

to infomat Ion at the disposal of the Soviet government, the
statement made In the United States note concerning the armed
uprising in northern IranIdId not correspond to the facts.
These events had not constituted an armed uprising and were
not directed against the Iranian government.

On the contrary.

It was evident that this vaa:
matter of aspirations with respect to the
assurance of the democratic rights of the Azer^
baijan population of northern.Iran, which la
seeking national autonomy within the limite of
the Iranian State, and which haeilts own language,
-different from the Persian language,35
1
*
The note also stated that the "undesirable" incidents vhddh
had taken place had been caused by zreactionary elements
who were opposed to the extent ion of national rights to
the population of northern Iran,
Emphatically denying the accusations made in the Soviet
note, the Iranian government declared again that there was
33* Security Council Official Records. First Year, First
Series, Supplement Ko. 1., pp,
■JA, 2ÈM., PP. 57-58.
35. 2Uâ.. p. 57.

- 19 -

an armed uprising that amounted to rebellion#

It denounced

the Azerbaijan "Popular Assembly" as Illegal.
\nille this exchange of notes between the United States
and British governments with the Soviet government had been
proceeding, the Iranian government had sent the Soviet Union
37
a number of commijnloatlons protesting Soviet interference.
The communications dated November 17# 22, and 23# and December 1,
1945 are cited as examples,
A not© from the Iranian foreign minister to the Soviet
embassy In Tehran on November 17 cited a number of individual
Instances In which Soviet officials had Interfered with
38
Iranian internal affairs In the northern provinces. The
Soviet government was informed that orders had been given

1
*
tot the dispatch of the governor-general# governors, and

other officials to their posts In the northern provinces,
posts which hitherto had remained vacant because of Soviet
Interference,^ Troops were also being sent to re-establish
order, and the Iranian government requested the Soviet gov
ernment to allow these officials and troops to proceed to
their destination,
36; Ibid., p. 36.
37* lÈiâ** PP# 43 and 61, for index to communications,
38. Ibid.j p. 52,

On November 22, a note was sent by the Iranian ministry
of foreign affairs to the Soviet embassy which Informed the
embassy that the Iranian troops mentioned in the note of
November 17# had been stopped on their way to Tabriz from
39
Tehran, It was requested that the Soviet government tele
graph instructions to Soviet military authorities that the
troops be allowed to ;proceed#

Agrain it way emphasized

thàt only the early arrival of this force could restore
order in Azerbaijan#
The Iranian government sent the Soviet embassy a
note on November 23, and the request that telegraphic instruc
tion should be Issued to the Soviet military authorities
40
to let the Iranian troops pass, was urgently renewed* The
assurances made by the Soviet government In the tri-partite
treaty and the Tehran declaration were called to its attention
In replying to these Iranian communications, the Soviet
embassy on November 26 denied the accusation that Soviet:
4:
authorities were interfering in the internal affairs of Iran#
After reviewing in detail the charges contained in tho Iranian
39. Ibid*. P. 52#
40#k Itid»m p # 53 #
4l.

PP* 55-56.
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note of’Kovcm'ber 17» tho Soviet Government declared that no
responsibility vas attached to It for the absence of Governors

or other officials In the northera provinces. With roGard
to the dispatch of'armed forces to Azerbaijan, the reason
given for the holding up of the Iran Ian forces was that '
their arrival In this province would cause disturbances and
bloodshed.

The Soviets, could not let this happen.

Since Soviet actions had constituted a breach of Iranian
sovereignty and Independence, the Iranian government countered
that the arguments of the Soviet government were Inadmissable.
Therefore on îîovember 26, the Iranian government addressed
a'note to the United States, the'United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union, which stated that disturbances and disorders
had occurred In parts of Azerbaijan and that the central
government had lost touch with Its ^officials and was unable
to Issue the necessary Instructions to the authorities con—
42
<
cemed. The Iranian government stated Its willingness! to
examine any conplaints which did not constitute acts of dis—,
obedience against the central government, but It hoped
that the three governments would recognize the heed of taking
steps a^Inst thé rebel elements. Attention was drawn to
the fact that the question was of the upmost Importance and
I*
42; iMd., p; 56.
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urgenoy^ and Iran aslted that the power concemed (the U*S*8.R.)
Bhould olvo the necessary Instructions to Its authorities
to relieve the situation*
On December 1$ the Iranian government answered the
43
Soviet note of November 26 referred to above* It was asserted
that the Iranian government did not wish to give further
explanations concerning the charges of interference of Soviet
officials in the past in the internal affairs of Iran,
Charges which the Soviet Union had said were unfounded*
Hope was expressed that the intervention of Soviet authorities
in the.internal affairs of Iran would cease; in order to
maintain public order and national security, Iranian forces
must have full Jurisdiction over Iranian territory.
.Since it Was unable to secure Soviet oompllm//ce with
its requests, the Iranian government again-.sent a note to
44
the governments of the Big Three, It was noted that: in view
of the fact that the presence of foreign troops in Iran had
caused dislocation in all the affairs of the country, it
was essential that the question of putting an end to the sit
uation should be discussed at the foreign ministers con
ference then being held in Koscow*
43. Ibid.. pp* 56-60*
44* Itid.* p. 60*

23 -

45
Consequently, et thla conference Ernst Bevln, supported
46
"by James F# Bymes, made a proposal that a tr1-partIte
commission for Iranian affairs,composed of the representatives
of Great Britain, ^he United States, and the Soviet Union,
be formed and'Invested with wide powers,

According to the

Information Bulletin out out by the U,S,0,R, embassy in
the United States*
The Soviet Government, true to its policy
of respecting the state Independence of all
countries, declined the proposal as one violating
the sovereignty and national Independence of Iran*
In this case the Soviet Government acted in the
spirit of the principles of democracy in relations
between countries and nations big and small, which
it consistently and steadfastly pursues in all
its actions on the international scene,47
Since nothing came out of the foreign ministers con^
Terence in. Moscow to help the Iranian government's case,
on January 19, 1946

Iran submitted the question of inter

vention in its internal affairs'to the Security Council
would recommend that the Soviet government cease its inter
ference in the internal affairs of Iran, and also that It
45, Ernst Bevln, (1881-1951) was a member of the economic
advisory council and various labor organizations. He was
minister of labor and national service, 1940-45, and was
chairman of the trades union congress in 1957. In 1945
he was made secretary of state for foreign affairs, and
in 1946 he was a delegate to the United %atipns*
46, James F, Byrnes, (1879—
) was a member of congress,
1911-25,. and. was a senator Ih 1931, Frcaü 1941-42 he was
a associate Justice of the U.S. supreme ooûrt, and in 1943
was director of economic stabilisation. He was director
of the office of war mobilisation, 1943-45, and was secretary*
of state, 1945-47, In 1946 he was a delegate to the United
Nations,
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would order Its military and civil authorities in Iran to
permit Iranian forces and officials to carry out their
functions of maintaining law and order.
IT
Iran has become over the centuries an area of
troversy for several great powers.

cchi-

The two powers mostly

Involved in furthering their policies at Persian (or Iranian)
expense have been Russia (the Soviet Union) and Great. Britain*
But at times other powers have shown interest in the internal
affairs of Iran, as evidenced by Germany before the two
world wars and the United States In World War II# Whereas
Imperial Russia and Great Britain were able to reach an
agreement over their respective interests in Iran, the Soviet
Union and Great Britain* except during World War II* have
been unable to do so. This divergence of views between
the Soviet Union and Great Britain has helped Iran to main
tain Its sovereignty and Independence.

When the two great

powers were able to compromise their views, Iran lost its
sovereignty and Independence and could do nothing about it.
This intervention by great powers has had a profound effect
«ru Iranian foreign policy and has resulted In the playing
47# Information Bulletin.^ Embassy of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. Vol. VI., No. 44., Washington B.C.*
îlay 11* 1946, p. 378.

-
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off by Iran of one great power against the other*

In thla

way only has It been able to keep some semblance of sov
ereignty end independence.
When an International organization was created after
World War I» Iran, to settle Its difficulties with the
British over the Anglo-Iranlan Oil Company and with the
new Russian Republic, referred the disputes to the League
of dations.

The League proved a help to Iran In Its negoti

ations with Its powerful neighbors, even though the solution
of the disputes was found outside the League.

Iran pro

fited from League backing, because the League carried enougfc
prestige to Influence the decisions of the negotiations*
When both Great Britain and the Soviet Union considered
that the situation In Iran warranted Intervention In World
War II, Iran’s sovereignty was violated, and It was forced
to agree to a treaty that gave the Allies almost everyrlght they wanted.

While the great powers were In agreement,

Iran had no chance to protect Its Interests, but after the
war, Iran again was able to play them off against each
other. After Its unsuccessful appeal to the Soviet Union
to cease Intervention In Iran’s domestic affatls, Iran
had to take Its case to the International organization, the
United Bâtions*
The U.S.S.R. had not lived up to Its commitment a made
to Iran In the Soviet hour of need* When it was assured of

-
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victory over Germany, the Soviet Union*a attitude toward
Iran changed.

Its Interference In the internal affairs of

Iran led to a dispute that was to be the prelude to the
"cold war* a tension that in turn was to characterize the
split between the west and east.

Fortunately for Iran, there

was an International organization to which it could present
Its complaints and hope for a Justifiable settlement.
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CHAPTER 2.
THE BEVIN RESOLUTION

The Iranian question was Introduced to the United
Nations during the second meeting of the Security Council
1

in London on January 25, 1946.

Sayyid H. Taqizadeh, head
2

of the Iranian delegation, earlier had sent a letter on
January 19, 1946 to Gladwyn Jebb, executive secretary of
the United Nations, In which he complained of the inter
ference of Soviet officials and armed forces in Iranian
internal affairs.

At that time, the Iranian government

claimed that Iran unsuccessfully had tried to negotiate
4
with the Soviet Union under the provisions of Article 33
1. Sayyid H. Taqizadeh was born at Tabriz, Iran. He was
minister to Great Britain, 1929-30 and minister to France,
1933-54. Again minister to Great Britain, 1941-44, he
also became chairman of the Iranian delegation to the Gen
eral Assembly in London, 1946.
2. Security Council Official Records. First Year, First
Series, No. 1., Church House, Westminster, London, (17
January 1946 to 16 February 1946), p. 15#
3. Hubert Miles (Gladwyn) Jebb,(1900) entered dip
lomatic service in 1924, and was made acting councilor in
the foreign office, 1941. In 1942 he became head of the
reconstruction department, and in 1946 he became deputy to
the assistant under-secretary of state and the United Nations
advisor.
4. Article 33 of the United Nations Charters **1. The parties
to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, med
iation, conciliation, arbitration. Judicial settlement, re
store to regional agencies or arrangements or other peace
ful means of thèir own choice. 2. The Security Council shall,
when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle
their dispute by such means.

«V

of the Charter#

2 8

"•

How# heoauae of the failure of the attempt

to negotiate# Iran was Bubmltttng the dispute to the Security
5
Council under Article 35# paragraph 1.
Prior to the submission of the question to the Security
Council# the Iranian letter had been circulated among the
members of the Council. Therefore# the president# H.J.O,
6
Makln of Australia# felt that there was no need to read It#
and since there were no comments from.any of the members#
the question was included on the agenda without delay#
7
At the beginning of the discussion# Andrei Ï. Vyshinsky
(U«S#S#H#) wanted to know whether the Inclusion of the question
on.the agenda had been for "consideration of the question
or .discussion as to whether It should come before the Council
5# Article 35, paragraph 1# of the United Nations Chairter;
"Any member of the United Nations may bring any dispute
or any situation of the. nature referred to In Article 34#
to the attention of the Security Council or of the General
Assembly#*
*•i •
6, Norman J.O. Makln# (1889-^
) became speaker of the
house of representative8# 1929‘*31# and was minister for
navy and munitions# 1941-46# He was ambassador to the
U.S.A., representative to the General Assembly# the Security
Council# and the Trusteeship Council, In 1946 for Australia.
7# Andrei Ï. Vyshinsky, (1893) became a member of the
Communist party In 1920, and a commissar for the deputy
publlo-prosecutor and public prosecutor#. 1935-39. He was
Tlce-forelgn,minister In 1946 and was the chairman of the
U«S.S#E. delegation to the General Assembly and a member
of the Security Council.
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8
at all?** If It were only Intended to dlscusa whether the
question should be considered or not, he had no objection
to Its Inclusion on the agenda* Even so, he was going to
present to the Council, at the next meeting, reasons why
the question should not be considered at all*
Because he believed that the Iranian question was
put before the Oouncll to embarrass the Soviet Union,
Vyshinsky at this time counter-attacked by asking for the
»

Inclusion of the Greek question on the agenda to embarrass
the United Kingdom* But, Bevln countered this move by
claiming that he wanted everything "brought out Into the open"
where he could clear up any mlnunderstandings as to Britain’s
9
relations with Greece* He also wanted the Iranian delegate
to be given a'chance to state his case at the Council table*
10
In agreeing fully with Bevln, Edward R* Stettin lus
revealed the existence of an Anglo-American bloc that was
soon to be an antl-Sovlet bloc.

Indeed, at the very beginning

of the discüsalon over Iran; the split between east and west
8; Security Council Official Records* First Year, First
Series, No# 1*, p* 16*
9e Ibid#, p# IT *■
10. Edward R* Stettlnlus, (1900-1949) was chairman of the
war resources board, 1939 and lend-lease administrator,^
1941-43* He was secretary of state, 1944-45 and chairman
of the U.S.A* delegation to Dimbarton Oaks, 1944 and UNCIO,
1945. In 1946 he was representative to the General Assembly
and the Security Council*

^
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became evident, and It prosresalvfelj worsened as the
dispute continued*

The United States and the United King

dom representatives from the first to the last of the dispute remained In complete accord.
After listening to the arguments Just, presented, Abdel
11

Hamid Badawl Pasha, (%Tpt) formally moved to have the
Iranian delegate seated at the Council table. And when
Vyshinsky showed no opposition to the seating of the Iranian
delegate, the Egyptian delegate's resolution was adopted
12

without opposition.

The Iranian delegate was not seated

In this meeting, however, because the members got Involved
In a debate over whether the Council could discuss a case
after It had been heard, eventually deciding that the Council
had the competence to decide the treatment to be accorded
13
various matters when they came before It. The president
then adjourned the meeting.
11. Abdel Hamid Badawl Pasha, fl887) became legal advisor
to the government, 1922-23, and was chief legal advisor,
1926-40. He was minister for foreign affairs, 1945^6
and was chairman of the Egyptian delegation to the UHGIO,
1945. In 1946 he was representative to the General Assembly
arid the Security Council and a Judge on the International
Court of Justice.
12. Security’Council Official Records. First Year, First
Series, No. 1., pp. 18-19.
13. Ibid.. pp. 19-20.

- 51 -

Already it had been decided that each member would
serve as president for one month, and they would assume the
office alphabetically, beginning with the Australian rep
resentative,

In this first meeting to hear the Iranian

question, the pattern for lAter meetings was set* Issues
would be decided when they arose; no comprehensive plan of
conduct was to be worked out In advance.

Already, too, the

antl-Sovlet bloc was forming, and the Soviet delegation
from the beginning tried to prove that the Iranian case
?

was false,
II
The Iranian question was taken up again In the third
meeting of the Security Council on January 28, 1946, After
inquiring If the Council had any comment on the seating of
the Iranian delegate, the president observed that the
Iranian question was the first occasion on which the Security
Council had been called upon to act under Chapter 6 of the
Charter (ffaclflo Settlement, of Disputes"),

Consequently,

since the proceedings In this case were likely to serve as
precedents for the future, the Council should act with care.
To get under way, the president suggested that the

Iranian

argument be heard first and then the Soviet, At this point,
Vyshinsky Interrupted to say that the question could be
T
f 1
discussed only In Its procedural aspect, after which the
Council accepted the president's proposal and sat back to

hear the Iranian oaae»
Taking omaiderable time to present his case, Taqizadeh
examined the tri-partlte treaty and the Tehran declaration»
explaining in detail the manner

vrhich the Soviet Union

had violated its pledges by its recent actions in Iran#

The
14
Iranian delegate at the same time submitted a memorandum
in which the particulars of Soviet interference were re
stated in greater detail* and all the communications between

Iran* the Soviet Union* the United States* and the United
Kingdom were noted* His basic argument was that Iran fiad
tried to negotiate with the Soviet government, but, in spite
of all that the Iranian government had done* and for reasons
unknown to the Iranian delegate* the Soviet government had
refused to work for a settlement* He called attention to
the Iranian note of December 1* 1945 in which the Iranian
government had expressed satisfaction with a Soviet note
that earlier had Implied that interference by Soviet troops
and authorities would cease# But in this same note* the
Iranian government also had asked unsuccessfully for a
Soviet guarantee of freedom of movement for Iranian officials
and troops in Ihan#

In making his accusations* Taqizadeh

4

carefully reminded thl listeners that Iran at all times wanted
friendly relations with its northern neighbor*.
14* Security Council Official Records. First Year, First
Series* Supplement 2^o. 1#* Church House* Westminster*
London* 1946*
25-42#
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VÿBhlneky^ In rebutting the Iranian argument^ for the
moment put aside the question ef aubstqnoe (the actual
situation as it existed in Iran) and dealt only with the
15
procedural aspects of theqpestion* Because they did not
meet the conditions specified in the Charter# thequeationa
raised by the Iranian delegate could not be discussed# so
Vyshinsky argued.

As he said# there were two main points

in the procedural aspect i first# whether negotiations had
taken place; and second# whether results had been achieved
by negotiations. According to Vyshinsky# the Iranian delegate
had refuted his own statement that no negotiations had taken
place by admitting that hot only had the Iranian govern
ment endeavored,to negotiate with the Soviet government# but
that tucl> negotiations actually had taken place.

It vàs.

Vyshinsky’A contention that the Iranian government was satis-t

-

fled with the results of the neogitatlons of November and
December# 1945. As proof# he cited the Iranian not© of
December 1# 1945 alreadymentioned by the Iranian delegate.
Vyshinsky made much of the fact that the U.S.S.R., bad
the legal right to keep troops in Iran. This legal right
had been obtained# of course# under the tri^partite treaty
which gave the Soviet Union six months after the cessation
of hostilities with Germany to withdraw Its troops. But the
six month period was not yet ended# since the Soviet IMion
15. Security Council Official Records. First Year# First
Series# No.l.# p. 59.
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bad aet the terminal date alx months after the end of the
r

nar with Japan rather than the war with Germany, as had been
epee ifled in the treaty.

March 2, was the date given by

the Soviet Union for the withdrawal of its troops*
While trying to conform the articles of Chapter 6 to
his viewpoint, Vyshinsky got into the legality of the question,
As concerned Article 33# bilateral negotiations had been
and were then taking place, and the Council, consequently
could not call on the D.5.S*R. to take the steps provided
16
for by the article. He denied that Article 34 was applicable
to the question, since it related to a dispute or situation
of quite a different order. Because the Iranian complaint
^

A

needed no such reaommendations as provided for in Article 36,
IT
paragraph 1, it too did not fit the case. The only method
for settling the Iranian question was bilateral negotiations
between the disputants.
l6* Article 3fP of the United Nations Charter: **The Security
Council may Investigate any dispute, or any situation which
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dis
pute, in order to determine whether the continuance Of the
dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security.*
IT. Article 36, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charters
*The Security Come 11 may, at any stage of a dispute of
thé nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of
like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods
of adjustment#*
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18
VyahlnBÎcy also denied that Article 37, paragraph 1,
permitted the Iranian charges^

This article envisaged a

situation In which the parties to a dispute found them
selves unahle to reach an agreement*

But, Vyshinsky averi^d,

no such situation existed In the relations of the U*S.S*R.
and Iran, and, consequently, there was no foundation for
the application of this article to the Iranian complaints*
Having decided that no part of Chapter 6 applied to the
Iranian question, Vyshinsky concluded that the Council had
no legal grounds for considering It,
The members by this time were tired of listening to
the lengthy exposition by Taqizadeh and to the equally long
Soviet tirade, and the president thereupon proposed the
postponement of the discussion until the next meeting,
Vyshinsky arguing the Inexpediency of dividing the dis
cussion Into %wo parts by a postponement, was Overruled
by the rest of the Council, and the meeting was adjourned.
Discussion of the Iranian matter was postponed until January 30,
18, Article 37, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter:
“Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to
In Article 33 fall to jettie it by the means Indicated In
that Article, they shall refer It to the Security Council,*
19, Security Council Offlolal Records. First Year, First
Series, No, 1,, p, 44,

36

—

Both parties to the disputa had presented their views
in this meeting, and, as can lb seen disagreed as to whether
negotiations had been concluded or not,

Vyshinsky presented

a good argument against keeping the question on the agenda
with his interpretation of the articles under Chapter. 6,
At the same time, however, the Iranian delegate made a good

ease out of the trl-partlte treaty, the Tehran deolaratiop,
and the alleged violations of these Soviet committments by
the Soviets themselves,
;
III
Since the discussion of the Iranian question had been
postponed until January 30, it did not come up again until
the fifth meeting, of the Council,

Repeating the request of

the Iranian delegate to make supplementary remards to his
statement of the third meeting, the president proposed
20
that Taqizadeh be allowed to spest^* Jt should be remembered
that since the Iranian delegate had no. voice In the pro
ceedings of the Council, he had to be invited especially
at each meeting to sit at the Council table#
Having gained,the floor, the IranIan delegate contested
I
the Soviet viewpoint that, since there had been negotiations
between the two parties^ the Iranian compliint, could not be
brought to the attention of the Council* Facta from the
Iranian memorandum of the third meeting again were presented
20 Ibid., pp. 45-46,
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aa evidence that negotiations between'the U.S.S.R, and Iran
had failed. Moreover^ the eagerness of the Iranian govern
ment to keep on good terms with the U.S.S.R. was demon
strated when Taqizadeh told how the Iranian prime minister,
21

Ahmad Uhavam, had eÿért:offered to go to Moscow In the hope
*
of reaching a settlement. But the Soviet government had
Ignored the offer of direct negotiation in Moscow,

No nego

tiations for the settlement of the dlppute had taken place,
"This also Included the note of December 1» 1945 mentioned
earlier).
Taqizadeh was very animated In maintaining that the
d1spute,hhaVIng found a place on the agenda, under "no cir
cumstances aust It go out of the hands of the Councllj It
must be parsued,* An Iranian proposal for dealing with the
*
question was presented I
1
The Council should take this m&tter under
Its jurisdiction; negotiations should proceed .
under Its aegis. Progress should be reported"to
the Council from time to time, and the results
should be reported to It with In a reasonable
lapse of time. In this way, we are ready toeet
Into direct negotiations with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, but under no circumstances
are we prepared to let the matter go out of the
Council.22
21. Ahmad Ghavam, (1872) held various toablnet posts,
1910-23 and In 1946 was appointed premier, minister of
Interior, and minister of foreign affairs.
22. Security Council Official Records. First Tear, First
Series, No. 1,, p. 49.

— 3#

After Taqizadeh had finished his retmttal, Vyohtae^
for the oeoond tine denounced the Iranian case*

He attached

Thqlzedeh** Bu^/plencntary statement that there nad been no
direct negotiations#

There must have been direct negotiations,

he paid, since there had to be a third person or state to
hove Indirect ne^otlatlona, and there ;.as no third person
or state In this case# Anjvay, It did not matter whether
there had been direct or Indirect negotiations, ea lonz
as there hadfieon negotiations. AsaIn commcntlnc on the
Iranian note of December 1, Tychlna^ asserted t‘
r-at the
Iranian government had teen satisfied with the result of
the necotlatlone# The Iranian delegate was accused of
deliberately" confusing the situation, end moreover, the
Iranians were not to be trusted# Thesa were strong words,
but the disparity In power between the two disputants made
It possible for Vyshlnshy to say almost any thinc he wished
about Iran or Its delegates#
According to Vyshlnshy, the presence of Soviet troops
In Azei^aljan had nothing to do with the events that had
occured there# The reunion was en Internal Iranian matter,
end the people of Azerbaijan were only trying to secure
their rightful national auton<X3y. Since the movsnoat did
not constitute anything unusual In any denooratio country,
there was nothing particularly wrong with It#
23. Ibid#, p. A9#
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Interference with Iranianraoops on their way to
Azerbaijan wae explained by Vyshinsky^ By allowing Iranian
troops to proceed, cniah bloodshed and a "useless massacre"
would have resulted# ond the Soviet troops could not

let

that happen, of course# Moreover* the Iron Ian notes following
the note of December 1# were sent only with the hope of
taking advantage of the Moscow conference*

Indeed* Vyshinsky

argued# the motive of the notes was toAdvance the idea
that all foreign troops should leave Iran#

The Iranian

proposal just made by Taqizadeh was not In keeping with
the Soviet position# Vyshinsky vigorously opposed having
the tJ*S#S#R# placed under some sort of special supervision#
It was incompatible with its dignity as a member of the
Security Council and "aa Incompatible with the dignity
. 24
of the United Nations#**
Taking exception to the Soviet representative's last
remarks, Taqlradeh replied that he had never admitted that
there had been negotiations without results as provided for
In Article 35* paragraph 1, of the Cbajrter#
Before the president opened the matter to general
discussion, the two divergent arguments can be summed up
in a few words.

The Iranian stand was that no negotiations

had taken place and that Iran had every right under the
reVetant articles of the Charter to present Its case to
24* jMl;# p. 53.

the Council and to expect Jud^nent on it# The Soviet
position was that negotiationa had taken place and that
the Iranian government had shown satisfaction over the
negotiations la the December 1 note* Also the Iranian
action in presentlag the case to the Council was lllcgol,
in that it did not fulfill the requirements of the articles
under Chapter 6 of the Chapter*
After the president had opened the quectlon to dis*
cusBlon, Devin started the debate by reading Article 4
of the tri-paxtite treaty, which stated that the ocoupatloa
forces would not constlTute a military occupation and that
25
internal effairs of Iran would be left alone* Because he
understood that it was an Iranian donestlo matter, Bevln
was "a little perturbed** when he heard Vyshinsliy say that
It,was the Soviet Union that had decided hew many Iranian
troops and police would be allowed In Azerbaijan. Gratl*
tude was expressed for the Iranian co-operation received
in the war.

Since the United Kingdom delegate o:uld xandej>«

stand and respect the tri-partite treaty, pja could not under
stand why the Soviets either could or would not under
stand and respect it. The whold Soviet position looked
like a "war of,nerves" to Bevin. Because he felt that Iran
should have the backing of the United Nations in its pre
dicament and Bhould not be left alone to face the Soviet

25* Oli*. P?. 54-55.

-
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Cnioa» hia coocXualon vas that the quoat! du should te
left on the
Stettinlua C3q>re8aed somewhat the sane view as Bevln
and cade a eu^estlon to thla effects
Cannot the Council ecree to permit the two parties
to ne&otlatO voluntarily end Keep the Council
Informed until a mutually satlsfactorj solution
Is found la accordance with justice!?»
•

»

Taking note that thla was the first case brought before
tiio Security Council end that It called for the greatest
care on the pert of the Council In dealing with It, Welllngtoh
27
Koo (China) said the Idea presented by the United States
28
delegate vas a good oae. Also the Soviet delegate should
be concratuiated for his assurances of good w111# The
29
French representative, Georges Bidault, also argued that this
26. Ibli., P# 58.
27. V.E. Wellington Koo, (1868) became minister of
foreign affairs In 1922, 1924, and*1931» and vas prime
minister In 1927. He was a member of the world court, 193223» and was also a delegate to the League of nations Assembly
and Council, 1932-39. In 1945 he was a representative to the
uaCIO, and In 1946 to the General Assembly and the Security
Council,
28. Security C‘>uncil Cfflelsl RecoNs. First Year, First
Series, Lo,!,,
58^9.
29. Georges Bidault, (1899^
) î^as leader of the popular
den00ratio party and was elected president of the national
resistance oouncll, 1943. Ho was twice minister of foreign
affairs clnco 1944, and was once prenler-presldent. Ho
was a member of the council of foreign ministers, and was
chairman of the Fr.noh delegation to the UXIO, 1945 and
the General Assembly and Security Ctmoncll, 1946,

T.
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case waa Inportant froa the standpoint ofprecedent,
Becauce he adhered.to the view that the parties to the dispute
should to allowed to negotiate end that the Council retain
the rlcht to reconsider the question at any time If the ne^otatlons failed, Bidault approved of the attitude of the antlSovlet bloc.
»

A point of view differing:fran the la^t four now cone
31
to llcht when lycjaunt Ilod&elcwahl (Poland) baclwd the Soviet
represontatlvo’s idea to have tîoe partie a settle the dispute
32
by direct negotiation, ft.divergence between the Soviet bloc
and the antl-Sovlet,bloc can be noted fron the way in v h U h
the mecbers of the Council ezjresscd their vlews^ Poland
usually followed the Soviet lead and usually was the only
ono on the Soviet side,
33
Blco IT.-van*Eleffens (Netherlands) made a proposal
34
which he thought would meet the case. It followed some
what the Stettlnlus suc^estlofn. In tMt while the parties
30. Security Council"Officiai F^cords» First fear. First
Series, &o.l., p. 59.
31. lycnunt Ilodzelewskl, (1900) was an officer in the
Polish army In «‘orld War, 1%, and was anbasaador to the U,s,S.R,
Ind was minister of foretco affairs, 1945. Ije was represent
ative to the Ccneral. Assembly and Security Council, 1946.
32. Deourity Council Official Rggorda, First lear. First
Series, No.l., p. 60.
1
**
33# Elco
van KLeffens, (1894) became a menbor of the
eeoretarlat of the Lea^uo of liatione, 1919-21, and was In the
ministry for foreign affolrs, 1923-29. He was chief of the
diplomatic oectljo, 1929^39, and was minister without port
folio and Netherlands representative on the Security Council
and Economic and Social Commission, 1946-47.
34. Security Council C^ielrl Rccci^lc, First rear. First
Series, No.l.V pp. o^O^l.
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would negotiate directly, the question would be kept on
the agenda.

Speaking not as the president of the Council,

but as the representative of Australia, Xakin agreed with
the British, American, Chinese, French and Netherlands
representatives, i.e.. that the question should be kept on
the agenda.
Bevin withedto hear the Netherlands delegate’s pro
posal read in full, and van Kieffens complied. After he
had heard Ithat was proposed, Bevin suggested two amendments
that negotiations should be resumed Immediately, and that
36
the parties should Reep the Council informed of the results*
These suggestions were ccmsldered tantamount to a resolution.
Although favourably impressed with Bevln’s suggestions,
Stettlnlus wanted it understood that the question would
remain on the agenda, Bevln said that this was intended,
and the two western allies as usual reached agreement! As
he saw nothing different in the two proposals, van Kieffens
withdrew his proposal for the British*
A different idea.came into the discussion when Modzelewdki suggested the substitution of another text for the
last part of Bevin'0 resolution, to the effect that no time
limit be placed on the disputants to report the progress of
37
the negotiations taking place between them. Bavin Immediately
35- ItId.. PP. 61t62,
3^# -Ibid.a p. 63.
37. Ibid.. P. 65*

tooKexception and brought Article 35 Into the discussion*
If the Polish amendment were accepted, Bevin ai^ued. It
Would mean that the Council had heard the question and had
gotten rid of It without seeing that results had been achieved,
After being quiet for sometime, Vyshinsky now got back
Into the discussion.

Since the question did not threaten
3S

world peace. It could not remain on the agenda*

Therefore,

there were no Grounds for Bevlrta resolution, and It should

be removed from the agenda. - He also intimated that there
was more to the British proposal than met the eye. I.e..
tliat the British representative had some other reason than
a desire to settle the dispute*

Bevln denied the Soviet

charge and was sure that if Vyshinsky looked at the matter
**ln a reasonable way and without suspicion,* he o:uld see
39
the legality of the resolution* The resolution was pro
posed, not out of any .distrust of the Soviet government,
but to fulfill the obligations Imposed by the Charter*
Declaring that the question of leaving or of not leaving
the matter on the agenda was merely a formality. Zoo asserted
that the Council had the po:>er and the responsibility to
Investigate any question or situation which might affect
world peace In general.

Of this he was certain, he regarded

38* The Security Council can discuss only disputes or
situations that threaten the maintenance of world peace*
39# Security Council Official Records. First Year, First
Series, No* 1., p. 67.
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the proposal that the question remain on the agenda as pure
formality#

If the negotiations were satisfactory, the Council

would be only too happy to take the question off the agenda#
If the negotiations were unsuccessful, Ine or the other
party would be back to present its case, and the Council
again would consider the question. With respect to the
Iranian question, this seemed to be one of the most logical
deductions yet presented that ascertained the Council*s power
and responsibility.
The President wished to know whether the Council felt
like adjourning, but Vyshinsky wanted to know why the dis*
cuasion should be interrupted again; he wanted to **take“
40
a decision. The debate continued, and the Iranian rep-#
resentative stated that Iran would negotiate only were the
dispute to remain before the Council,

If the small natior/s

appeal were dismissed, the small nation’s of the world would
lose confidence‘in the Security Council,
Kodzelewski made an accurate remark when he called
attention to the fact that. If the members started referring
to the various articles of the Charter, justification could
42
be found for anything. He wanted a vote taken on his amend
ment to Bevln*8 resolution, since he thought his amendment
was the best submitted.
40, Ibid.. p. 69,
4l# Ibid*, p, 69,
42. Ibid,, pp, 69-70.
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Before a vote ooulü be taken on Kod2;elcwskl*a amondT
ment, Bevln read bis resolution?

Having heard the statements by the represent
atives of the Soviet talon and Iran In the coarse
of its meetings of 28 and.30 Jonuaiy, and
Having taken .^cqr^izance of the documents
preacnted by the Soviet and Iranian delegations
and those referred to In the course of the oral
debates;
Considering that both parties have affimed
thqlr readiness %o seek a solution of the matter
at Issue by negotiation; and that such negotiations
will be roeuned.ln the near future;
Requests the J>ajrtles to Inform the Council
of any results achieved in each negotiations*
The Oouncll la the meanwhile retains the right
at any time to request Information on the progress
Qf tl'iS negotiations*^^
T!ie president asked Hodzelcwskl If ho wished to proceed
with his oneadncnt*

The Polish delegate replied In the

affirmative and gave as his reason that he objected to the
words In the third paragraph, * and that such negotiations
will be resumed In the near future** He would accept the
resolution if these words were deleted, bcdause then his
proposal and Bevin*s would not diverge*

After Bevln had

maintained that Hodzelewckl had proposed nothing different,
the situation was cleared .up by Stettlnlus.

Since he

was the only one who had insisted on the words ^remaining
on the agenda,* he was willing to accept Bevin*a proposal
43* Ibi^., p* 70*

Al

with the xci^erstaa^llns that the question woiilJi renaln a
coatlnulnj concern of the Cc&noll until a SLttleaent had
been reached# Hodzelewskl said Uio nlcunderctandlnc vas
because of his poor Sn^lsh end withdrew his amendzncnt# The
resolution proposed by the representative of the United
44
K\iïQüm was adopted unanimously, and tîie neetlnc was adjourned*

17
With out taking: time Ocaapletelj to orcsnlze Itself
or to adopt rules of procedure and general ovcmll policies,
the Security Council, at Its second neetlnc, considered,
the Iranian question*

It did not evade its responslhlllty

as son© observers had feared,and

it showed the determination

of the delegates to cmke a working orcnnlsatlon out of the
United Narrions and to avoid. If possible, another world
conflict.
The Iranian dispute showed quite clearly the growing
rift between the Soviet and antl-Sovlet blocs.

Uhen Poland,

part of the Soviet satellite system, was the only nation
to back the Soviet Uniœi^s proposals, the split became
quite obvious.

It secned as if there wore & persc»ial antag

onism between the United ICincdoa representative, Levin, end
the Soviet representative, Vyshlnslty*

Since his resolutlcxi

was adopted, Bevln ccersed the victor in these particular
44# Ibid*, p. 71#

neetines In his debate with Vyehlnslgr* Since the Soviet
delegate* who at all tlzea had clalined that It was illeesl
to Include the question on the abends^ ended by not opposing
the adoption of the resolution^ the Zevln resolution yas
adopted unanimously»
^ The American delegate, Stettlnlus, expressed himself
very briefly and then only to back Devin. Th® main play
of wordfvWas between the Soviet representative on one hand
and the^ United Klogdoa representative with support fRoa
the Chinese, French^ Netherlands, Snerlcan and the Iranian
delegates on the other#
TXiB United Klagdoa resolution was passed amid hopes

that the Iranian question would be settled by negotiation
and c o ^

,forgotten-,, The question already had placed

4 strain on the new United Nations, and axie observers
felt that It vas not Important enough to jeopardize the
future of the organization#
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CHAPTER 3.
THE SOVIET

walkout

I
The hopes end expectations of the members of the
Security Council that they were through with the Iranian
question were not fulfilled• The Security Council was no
sooner settled in its new quarters at Hunter College* New
York than the Iranian dispute confronted _it again# The
first meeting of the Security Council in its new quarters
was on %irch 25# 1946, and the Iranian question came up
on March ^6#
A letter dated March 18, 1946 from the Iranian rep♦
resentative to the seeretàryygeneral and a indentical copy
to the president of the Council brought the question directly
to the attention of the Security Council*

The Iranian gov-

eminent presented its case under Article 35» paragraph 1,
of the Charter, the same artidle it had used when fimt pre
senting its case. While the note mentioned new troubles
that had developed eince the adoption of the Bavin resolution,
Soviet Intervention in Iranian affairs and the presence of
Soviet'troops cm Iranian soil were still the main Iranian
eomplaints* The Iranian government maintained that it wished
to remain an Independent and sovereign state, and the
immediate and Just solution of the dispute by the Security
1. Security Council Official Records. First Year, First
Series, Supplement Ho# 2#, Hunter College, the Bronx, Hew
York, pp. 43r44.
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Council waa of the greatest Importance for the preservation
of good relatlcms with the U»3»S.R*
2

Andrei Gromyko, representing the Soviet Union In place
of Vyshinsky^ said that the U^S.S.R, "placed a great amount
of faith" in the Security Council as the chief organ for
3
the maintenance of world peace end security* After assuring
the Council of Soviet belief in the United Nations and of
Soviet disbelief in the domination of one country of another^
Gromyko proceeded to attack the Iranian letter along the
lines already set down by Vyshinsky*

An understanding had

been reached between the disputants * the evacuation of
Soviet troops had begun. In particular, on I-larch 24*

Stating

that there was no reason for the Inclusion of the "so called
Iranian question" and that negotiations were continuing,
the Soviet delegate made a proposal to the effect that the
Iranian question not be placed on the agenda*

The Inclusion

2* Andrei Gromyko, (1909^
) became counselor to the embassy
In Washington, 1939-^3, and was deputy minister for foreign
affairs, 1946* In 1945, he was acting chainmn of the Ü.3.S.R*
delegation to the UNCIO, and In 1946 he became a permanent
representative to the United Nations.
3* Security Council Official Records* First Year, First
Series, No. 2., Hunter dollege, New ’York, (25 >îarch to
26 ^une, 1946), p. 10.
4# Ibid.. p* XI*
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of the question nov

contradict the neonlog and the

spirit of the resolution previously adopted on January 30#
Byrnes, now representing the U.S.A., Immediately took
5
Iscue with the Soviet representative* If there had been an
understanding between the two disputants, why was there not

a joint statement to that effect?

It was intimated by

Bymes that all that was contemplated was the adoption of
a acenda thatwuld £lvc the Iranian rovcmncnt an opportunity

to present foots which In Its opinion constituted a threat
to International peace*
The solidarity of the antl-Sovlet bloc was again proved
6
as Sir Alexander Cadogan, now representing the United king
dom, endorsed what the United States representative had Just
stated* Tliere were two aspects to the question according
to Cadogani Cl) the resolution of January 30th (the 2e1rln
resolution) permitting the Council to request infonnation
on the progress of negotiations between the disputants, and
(2) the new Informatl.:n presented by the Iranien representative,

5.

PP. 1>15#

6* Olr Alexander George liontagu Cadogan,

)lecane

a delegate to-the League of lîations, and from 1933 to 1946

he was permanent under secretary of state for foreign affairs*
and attended all the Big Three conferences in U'orld i.ar II*
Ha was responsible for the 1st draft of the Atlantic Charter
and was the chalmon of the United Kingdom delegation at
tunbarton Oaks, 1944* In 1945, he vas a cenber of the united
Kingdom delegation to the U3CI0, and to the General Assembly
ond the Security Council in 1946*
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A third aspect also raised which Cadoccn thought ispartant,
J

the question of ccwîfldence, "confidence thnt the oonctlty ^
- T

of .treaties will bo respected.

He referred to the trl-*

partite trooty In this respect and the Soviet violation of It,
Other represontatIves of the Council oc^^ln gravitated
to one bloc or another.

The Matrallan delegate stimarlJisd

the position of the antl-Sovlet tloc when he no Id:
ÎTow we ask ourselves two questions. First
Is the subject natter of this aliened dispute
one which cornes within the competence of the
council? The answer, to ny nlnd, IJs jes. The
second quest loir Is; has It been properly presented;
The answer to that Is also yes. In the original
letter to the Secretary«-General of 19 March,
two parties to the dls;ate are naned. One of
those parties only has requested that this partIcluar Item should not be included In the apenda,
Ke have no information, no evidence before ue
whstevcr.
Therefore the view of the Australian dclccatloa
is thet^thlQ .question should be pieced on the
acenda,^
9
îîasaan Pacha, now representing Frypt, screed with the
antl-Sovlet bloc,
10

Oscar Lance,

(Poland) however, supported the Soviet

Î* Seouritv Council Official Records. First lear. First
Series, No.2,, p. 15*
8, Ibid.. p. 16.
9# Mahüioud Hassan Pasha, (l89j5) was educated In law.
He was the first Fcyptian nlnieter to the Scandanavlan
countries, 193^^1958 and was minister to the Ü.3.A*, 1938-#
He was a representative to the üHCIO In 1945, and in 1946
to the General Assembly and the Security Ccuncll.
10. Oscar Lange, (1904) became a professor of economics,
end taught in Poland and the U.S.A. Ho was embassador to
the U.S.A., 1945-47 and was representative to the Security
Council, 1946*
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bloo# He 6u(%]08ted that the Iranian conplaint he deleted
from the agenda of this particular moating though ho wanted
the question Kept on the agenda in the Ecnuo that the Council
was hound to do so under the Bovin resolution*

Lange inter

preted the term "agenda" to aaan the particular meeting in
progress, and he therefore thought it proner to move the deletion
11

Of the question from the agenda of this particular meeting*
Van ïdeffens thought that the Polish proposal was "quite
complicated*" ^11 that had to be dono was to apply Article 31
to the case.

Tills article states that any member of the.

United Hâtions may participate in Security Council meetings
without the right to vote* if its interests arc affected*
The o^er members, wltn the exception of the Polish delegate#
too^the antl-Covlet bloc’s position on t ie Inclusion of the
question on. the agenda*
Since the basic ideas of Articles

and 35 were to

bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter
that threatened world peace# Cr^nyho doclarod that the

12

United States delegate’s argument conflicted with the Charter*
The Iranian question did not meet this qualification* After
11* Security Council Official Hecorda. First Zear, First
Series, Ho.2», pp* l6-lo*
12* Ibid** pp. 19-22*
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attackin» the apeaohea by Bymea and Gadogon, the Soviet
delegate said there vaa no doubt as to the truth or the
Soviet statement on the results achieved during the course
of the negotiations with Iran* To protect himself and to
discredit tlwj anti-Soviet bloc’s argumenta, Gron^yho.brought
up the British otand in the Syrlan-I^cbcnon ease*

The British

la this case had "opposed any mention whatsoever of a time
limit for the withdrawal of British forces from Syria and
Lebanon*

Gromyko also intimated that the Iranian prime

minister had no knowledge of tho preeentatl.>n of the question
l4
to the Council by Hussein Ala, the Iranian mambassddor to the
United States*
Slnoe It was well over an hour after 12 noon, the president
15
,
now Quo Tal-Chl, (China), proposed that thobeetlnc be adjourned
until the next afternoon, because the representatives of
Egypt, Mexico, and the United States wished to speak# But
on a proposal by Byrnes, the president celled tho next meeting
for 3 p*m* the same afternoon*
13# Ibid.. p* 21*
14 Hussein Ala, (1582) was chief of the cabinet of the
ministry of foreign affairs, from 1906-17. He was a rorslan
delegate to Versailles peace conference, 1919-20, and was
minister plenipotentiary to SeaIn, 1920. From 1921-24 he was
chief envoy to the U.S.A*, and was minister to France 1927^32,
and a delegate to the League of Nations# lie was Iranian
ambassador to the U*S#A« in 1946*
15* Quo Tal-Chl, (1888) woo a member of the Jhlnese delegation
to the Paris peace conference, 1919 and to the League, 1932-33.
He was minister of foreign affairs 1941-44, and was a jrepreeentatlve to tho General Assembly and the Security Council, 1946

Aa cbaraoterlôtla of tl:e London aeetln&s* the division
of opinion betvera the east and west a^aln cane to 11^ht in
the twenty-fifth ncotins*

The two blocs continued to oppose

each other$ andy as la London^ the anti-Soviet bloc with the
preponderance of the votes could have its own way in pro
cedural matters#

The Soviet representative# though ably

stating hla case (that he did net want tho (question iaclUiled
on tho abonda) by questioning the lec&lity of the Council’s
action under articles 34 and 35* was unable to influence
the members of the anti-Soviet bloc#
II
The twenty-sixth meet ins was held according; to Bymei'*
wishes the same afternoon# and the discussion of the agenda
a&ain involved the Iranian question#
sentative was the first to speak#

The Egyptian repre

Dividing the problem

into two parts he said. First# can the petition of the Iranian
Government to this Council be received? Second# if so, may
16
we ask about the facta and noT& them#** The Council had **put
the cart before the horse,** since it had been discussing
the seocNfid part of the problem# He proposed that:
###the Council reoelve the complaint of the
Iranian Government embodied in its several
memoranda addressed to the Secretary-General
and sskfor an immediate vote on this question
alone.IT
16»

Cjurnn Official Records* First iear^ First

Serlea, «0 ,2 ., pp. 22-2?.

17.

p. 23.
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Bymes also thought that a vote should he taken on
whether the question should he included on the agenda. Since
the Soviet representative had made a proposal to delete the
18
question from the agenda, he wanted a vote taken on it*
The representative of a email power, Francisco Castillo
19
Rajera, (Kexico) brought up the email power's viewpoint#
If the violation of the trl-partite treaty did n^t constitute
a menace to international peace, "then all the small nations
20

are at the mercy of the stronger ones.* Under no circum
stances would he accept Gromyko*s interpretation#
The question of procedure soon.entered the discussion
because Lange did not think that it was the proper procedure
to vote on a motion to remove the Iranian question from the
21

agenda# Henri Bonnet,the French delegate, thought that the
Council should adopt the agenda unanimously and postpone
IS. I M d ,> p# 23.
19# Francisco Castillo Sajera, (1886} became minister
to China, Belgium, Hollanu and France, 1922-25, and was.
ambassador to the U.S.A., 1935-45. He was foreign minister,
1945-46, end was representative to the liZJSlO, 1945# I#
1946 he was chairman of the l<Jexlcan delegation to the General
Assembly and the Security Council#
20. Security Council Official Records. Firfat Tear, First
Series, «o,2,, p# 24#
21. Henri Bonnet, (1888) became a member of the League
of îJatiOQS secretariat, first in the division of press infor
mation, and later as executive-eecretary of the assistant
secretary-general of the League, 1920-31# He was ambassador
to the U.8.A# in 1944, and was a representative to the UHCIO
in 1945 and to the Security Council In 1946.
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22

discussion of the question until later;

This statement

was the forerunner of a French proposal that later was to
split the solidarity of the antl»^Soviet bloc;
After. Cadogan had commented on the point of procedure
raised by the Polish representative, and Castillo lîajera
had stated that all that had to be done vas to VDte on
Item 4 of the agenda. I.e.. the letters from the countries
concerned, Gromyko again proceeded to argue the Soviet case.

23

He agreed with the French representative, because It was
also hla vlev not to discuss the Iranian question; He also
vented to know If his proposal would be voted on If It came
after the vote on acceptance of Item 4 of the agenda;
The debate over the agenda was beginning to get confused
at this point;

The Council spent a good deal of Its time

arguing over matters .that seemed trivial, but It must be
remembered that the Council then was establishing procedure
to be used In later meetings, end the members wanted to get
everytiling straightened out to their eàtlàfactlon;
The Polish and Soviet delegates disagreed on whether
or not the Soviet proposal was an amendment or not*

Deciding

that the Soviet proposal was an amendment to Item 4 of tho
agenda, the president proceeded to put It to a vote; the
Soviet amendment was defeated by a vote of 9-2, end again
Security Council Official Records. First Year, First
Seflee, # 0 *2 ;, pi 24.

23: Ibid:. P:

25#

tho antl-Sovlet bloo had triumphed In a strictly procedural
24
matter.
Undaunted by this defeat, Gromyko now asked the Council
to postpone discussion of the question until April 10*

Post

ponement was necessary because important ne&otlatlons were
then going on, and the Soviet Union needed until that date
to submit the results to the Council,

This was *..,a minimum

demand on the part of the Government of the U.S,S,R* and*.*
25
this demand Is fully Justified,
After making more disparaging remarks about the Iranian government and Its dele
gation, Gromyko formally proposed the postponement of the
question until April 10, and he declared that were the proposal
not adopted he could not take part in the discussion of the
26

queition*

The Council was not enlightened as to what he

ment by not being prepared to take part in the discussion.
Probably on the assumption that the Council would give into
his demands, the Soviet representative in fact had threatened
It, However, the Soviet assumption proved to be wrong,
Hassan Pasha again brought up the proposal he had ifahde
that morning, i.e.. that the Council vote on the inclusion
of the Iranian complaint.
24. Ibid.. p. 27,
25. Ibid., p. 28;
26. Ibid.. p. 30,

Agreeing with the Egyptian delegate’s

^
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proposal, and thinking that the Iranian delegate should
he heard conoeming the April 10 postponement, Bymes made
the following statement|
Therefore If the representative of Egypt
moves as a substitute for the motion of the
representatives of the USSR that the represent
atives of the Iranian Government be permitted to
participate In accordance with the Charter* I
shall be happy to support that motion. If he
does pot with to make the taotlon, then I will made
the mot Ion*27
Bymes was determined to have a vote taken on whether the
Iranian question should be Included on the agenda, even to
the point of Ignoring the other proposals on the floor.
28

The Australian representative. Colonel William Hodgson,
now presented a completely different proposal.

To post

pone the case until written documents should be received
from both the U*S*S«£« and Iran was the gist of his suggestion*

29

yhen the documents had been received, the Oounoll should then
fix a date for the Investigation of the question by the Council
Itself* Although prepared to give favorable consideration
27. Ibid*, p. 51*
23.* Lieut. Colonel william H, Hodgson, (1892> had an
army and diplomatic carrer* He was a representative to
the UNCIO In 1945* and In 1946 was a member of the Australian
delegation th the United Nations, and was Australian delegate
to the Security Council the same year.
29# Security Council Offlclaj Records. First Year, First
Series, No* 2., pp. 31-3g*

to the Soviet requeat to postpone the question, Rod^reoa
wqnted it clearly understood that the question should re
main on the agenda and that action would be taken when the
written documents were received*
The Council now was faced with the dilemma of having
three motions before It without adequate rules, of procedure
to guide It* The members were never more conscious of the
lack of these procedural rules, and they were slow to set
precedents that would be used In later cases*
While supporting the Egyptian proposal, Cadogan said
that he could not understand why the Soviet representative
30
needed this delay* It would be better to hear-the Iranian
delegate In person than to receive'written material, aa the
Australian representative had suggested*

The Iranian delegate

was sitting in the audience and was ready at any time to
take his seat at the Council table to present the necessary
evidence*
The Australian representative, however, was supported
by Lange, because the Polish delegate In giving his support
to Hodgson fulfilled the wishes of the Soviet Union* Again
attacking the Egyptian proposal',. Gromyko said that It was
contrary**to common sense*"
30* M l . »

pp. 33-34.

31. M l . ,

Pè 34*

Castillo Ha]era here broke into

the debate and made some rather pointed renarka about
32
the Soviet and roXiah representatives. Gronyho had
mentioned a statement made by the Iranian prime minister,
Ghavaa, In which Ghavam vaa supposed to have expressed hope
that positive résulta would come :ut of the negotiations.
But as Castillo Najera sarcastically noted, the Soviet delegate
had received his information from the press, and the press
as everyone knew was not always accurate.

After noting

Lange*a statement that communications between Iran and the
United States were poor and that therefore the Council should
wait for Information, Castillo ^Jera sold that he wanted to
hear the Iranian representative*8 personal opinion on this
point*
The viewpoint of the small nations was pleaded by Bymes
when he remarked that It was a "rather renarksblc procedure**
that the Imnlen government should be permitted to present
Its case, but that Its representative could not be heard.
He imagined a case In which International peace was threatened
and In which the Council would say, "lour representative say
^

•

attend, but he may not present his cas*#

33

He warned that

the small nations might lose faith In the. United nations, if
32. fhld.- pp. 35"~3^#

33# m i . # p. 36.

—
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tha Iranian representative were not allowed to speeLk*
Since there were six small pawers on the Council, and since
34
he needed seven affirmative votes to pass the proposal
35
he desired, Byrnes pleaded the small powers cause.
The debate now became more and more a personal and
national struggle between Byrnes and Gromyko when the latter
36
acidly answered Bymes* statement. If the question were
being considered in its substantive rather than its pro
cedural aspect, the Iranian delegate would have a right to
sit at the Council table.

At the moment, the question of

Whether the Iranian delegate should be permitted to make
a statement on the postponement only confused things.
Van Eleffens attitude was that the Iranian delegate
had a right to be seated under Article Jl, and **that was
that,* Again Byrnes demanded a vote on the Egyptian proposal
and asked;
If the representative of the USSR should say
that he desired to postpone consideration until
1 January next year, would anyone say that would
not vitfidly affect the Iranian Government and
that it should not be permitted to make a statement.^ü
34, Article 27 of the United Nations Charter; **1, Each
member of the Security Council shall have one vote, 2,
Decisions on procedural matters shall be made by an affir^
native vote of seven members,"
35# Security Council Official Records. First Year, First
Series, No, 2., pp, 36-27*
36, Ibid,# pp. 37-38.
37« %bid,, p* 38,
^8. Ibid.. n* "^8.
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Kow the question of the three proposais oaae up^
President Quo Tal-Chl was not quite ole&r just what to do#
He deteraloed the fact that there were two notions on the
floors one by the Soviet representative, and one by the
Egyptian delegate. But the Australian notion puzzled him.
He ruled that a vote should be taken in the order in which
they had been presented* first the.Soviet proposal, then the
Egyptian proposal, and last the Australian proposal.

And

after the Iranian representative had been heard, the Council
then would be In a better position to consider the question
of postponement.

The president seemed quite sure that the

Iranian delegate would be heard, and it was quite obylous
at this point that the majority of the members were of the
same opinion#
Wanting to make sure that his views were correctly
understood, Hodgson declared that he had no objection at
all to the seating of the Iranian delegate, but he wanted to
40
get all the^facts of the case. Hassan Pasha after informing
the Council that he was a Judge, said tliat the Council wcB
a tribunal and that the

members of the Council were in
41
fact Judges#
They had every right to decide whether.-tho

39. Ibid.. pp. 33-39.
AO, Itli... pp. 39-40.
41,

pp, 4@-4l.
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3&8* should he postponed or not. He rejected the Australian
vlowpDlnt when he maintained that It was up to the tribunal
to decide whether the evidence it w:uld consider was to
be oral or written.
By this time. Lance vac tirod* Kc thOv^rht that it
would be better to "attack the problem with clear minds"
end succestcd that the Council should adjourn until the next
day#

But the French representative proposed that the

question of voting be referred to a sub-cooaittee for a
compromise solution. After acrceinc with Sonnet» the pres-*
ident appointed ^ sub—committee made up of the repre sent42
atives of the U#S.A#*the U.S.S.R., and France. The sub
committee was to report by 3 p.a. the following day on any
pro£reea it bad made, and the proposal was adopted by 9
votes.

The meeting was then adjourned.

After much fruitless argument over the inclusion of
the Iranian question on the agenda and the seating of the
Iranian delegate, the question was side-stepped for the
mmnomen) with the appointment of the eub-c omit tee. There
seemed very little chance that the aub-comnittee would solve
anything, since its members probably would heop their same
views. When the Council was confronted with three motions
at the same time, this sub-committee was established to
try to work out a compromise solution, and to set forth
42. Ibia.. pp. 42-43.

eoae method of procedure tliot opuld he followed In the future*
III
Tho twenty-seventh meeting of the Security Council
was held on March 27* 1946*

It opened with the report of
43
tha Buh-conialttee that nothing; had been accanpllshed*

The Council, therefore, was in the same dllen^a as at the
end of the last meeting
: Longe said that he vas sorry to hear thet the subcoomitteehad failed*

Kow it was hie idea to consider the

44
Australian proposai.second and the Egyptian proposal third#
If the Egyptian.proposal were voted on first, the Australian
proposal would be lost*
Council*

His .reasoning was not lost on the

If the Egyptian proposal were approved, the Iranian

represnntatlve would be heard, and the Australian proposal*
which Lange supported would not have a .chance to be voted rm#
îhis was the beginning of a long and heated debate over
which notion should be voted on first, but it was finally
decided to vote aft the president earlier had suggested
This debate typified the confusion and uncertainty in which
the Council sometime found Itself while trying to settle
43. &ocuz'ity Council^ ^ourMal. First Year, :io*21, 2 April, 1946*
P. 407.
44I

Ibid.. p* 408*
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difficult questions of procedure*
The president, throughout the discussion arcaed In
favor of the votlnc procedure that he had su^cested*

If

the C*C*S.R. proposal were not adopted, the I^ciptlaa pro
posal then would te vôted on, and If it pacsed there .would
A5
he no need for a vote on the Australian proposal* The
Australian représentâtlye disagreed* Hodgson asked the
president to coînply* with the Polish request to put his pro46
posfil second in the voting* The president, however, contended
that tho proposals were of equal importance and that they
should to voted on in the order of their presentation*
When the time oamè to vote, he wDuld te [lad to hear the
Views of the other members on this subject*
not understanding what the Australian delegate meant,
Hassan Pasha wanted to know whether the Iranian representative
was to produce the documents (called for tj rlod^son) In
person or while absent.

The Iranian delegate should not

present the documents, in person at tho moment, was Hodgsoh**
47
Idea* He realized that the Iranian representative was sitting
In the nudenoe with a prepared statement, but ho wanted
the facts submitted in writing. Then he and the other
members could study them, at leisure end get a clear picture
45. Smcurltv Council Officiai Records!. First Year, First
Series, IÎ0.2., n* 45*
46. IbjLd.. pp. 45-46.
47. Ibll.. PP. 45-47.
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of just "ichat was what" before they took action on the
case.
After expressing his "regret" over the failure of the
flub-*cooimittee, of which he was a member and in which he had
refused to compromise his position, Gromyko restated his
position that negotiations were taking place and that an
understanding had been reached#

Evidence of this under-

stalnglng was the Soviet announcement that Soviet'troops
would be withdrawn# Grcxayko had received his information
from the official U.S.S.R. news agency in the United States,
Tass# that Ghavam, the Iranian prime minister, had said that
the question of Azerbaijan was relatively unimportant and
could be solved as soon as an understaiding was reached
conoeming the withdrawal of Soviet troops#

In the light

»

of these circumstances. It was "incomprehensible" that the
members of the Council were unable to accept the "fully
Justified proposal of the USSR Government to postpone the
48
discussion of the Iranian statement until April 10*"
With the remark that the United States -delegation
received its Information, not from the newspapers, but dir-*
eotly from the Iranian government, Bymes refuted the infor
mation presented by the Soviet delegation,

Hia information

contradicted Gromyko’s statement in that the Iranian government
49
formally had said no agreement had been reached.
It was not
48* Ibid.. p. 49*
49* Ibid.. pp, 49-51*
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proper for the Council to act on a newspaper statement,
while the official representative of Iran was sitting In
the audience with an official statement in hla possession*
50
Another method of voting was proposed hy Bymes,
The Egyptian proposal should be voted on first, and if It
were carried there would be no need for votlnc on the Soviet
proposal,

After the Iranian representative had been heard.

If the Council desired. It could vote on the Australian
proposai*

This ouchestion was entirely antl-Coviet, since

it would allow for thé adoption of the Australian proposal
even were the Ecyptian proposal to be adopted*
Van Kieffens o^ecd with Byrnes and ashed Cronylco what
his reasons were for wanting to postpone the discussion until
51
April 10, He would be "enllghTened" If the Soviet represent
ative would "elucidate" on the questions asked.

An indirect

reference to British troops on Egypt Ian soil was then n&de
by Hassan Pasha, when he said, "Wo (the small nations)
want the big pov/ers to know that if an independent" country
does not want to have foreign troops stationed on its Bollg^
52
the big powers should comply with that,
He was speaking
of the Iranian situation at the tine, but the remark
50. Security Council Journal, First Year, Ho,2l, 2 April,
1946, pp, 412-413.
51. Ibid.. p. 414,
52. Security Council Official Records. First Year, First
Series, Ho,2,, p* 55.

Was pertinent to British troops on Egyptian soil*
At this point the president closed the discussion hy
asking for a vote on Lange *s proposal to place the Australian
resolution In the voting order Immediately following the
U*S.S.R* proposal*

Gromyko, however. Ignored the president
5:5
and addressed a **few remarks'* to the Council members*
If Bymes were so anxious to hear the opinion of the Iranian
representative, wliy did he not see Ala outside the Council

meetings,

Moreover, the Iranian representative could ex

press his opinion In private or could ocxnmunloaté with the
secretary-general anytime he felt like It* Bymes* real
reason, Gromyko charged, for not agreeing with the Soviet
position was because he wanted to discuss the substance of
the question*
Gromyko was getting a little heated when he turned
to the Netherlands representative* He answered the questions
put to him aa follows ; that direct negotiations were taking
place, and that an understanding had been reached for the
withdrawal of Soviet troops In five or six weeks "providing
that nothing unforseen happens*” It made no difference
whether the understanding was verbal or written, so long
as It had been reached. Agalh the Council was threatened
that, if.the discussion were not postponed, the U*S*S.S*
53. Ibid.. pp. 53-55.
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could not take further part In the discussion*

The proposals

should be voted on In the order they were presented.

This,

of course, suited Gromyko's purpose, since his proposal was
the first presented*
The president again declared the discussion closed*
This time he tried to put the U.5.S.R+ proposal to a vote,
but Gromyko again ignored him and attacked the procedure
for closing disaussiona*

He wasnted to know if the president

could close the discussion without a dicision from the members
of the Council, as the president was trying to do*

The

president replied that he had no more speakers on his list,
and Bonnet informed the president that he had no objection
to the president’s declaring the debate closed* But he
wanted the right to speak in explanation of how ha voted
55
after the vote on the U*S.S*R* proposal was taken* Byrhes
55
wanted the same right*
The U*2*S*R* proposal to postpone consideration of the
Iranian question to April 10 was put to a vote by a show of
hands, and waa rejected by a vote of 9-2.
U*G.S.R. voted in favor*

Poland and the

The anti-Goviet bloc with nine

votes effectively defeated the Soviet bloc on this pro
cedural matter,
54. IMâ*, P* 55.
55. Itid., p. 56*

Immedately after the vote was recorded,
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the president wanted to know the Council’s view on whether
to vote next on the Egyptian or Australian proposals* Ejraes
end Eassan fasha supported the view that the Egyptian pro
posal should be next» and Hodgscai and twinge argued that the
Australian proposal should be voted on before the Egyptian*
The French representative was regj^tful that the Council
could not agree unanaaiously on the procedural aspects of
Articles 34 and 35# Ho would vote In favor of the Sgyptian
proposal, because, "although it does not Include all that
56
I have said, neither does it exclude it*"
Gromyko now carried out his Intention to walK out#
He and the other mesibcrs of the Soviet delegation left the
Council cumber after he had made the following statement I
For reasons which I explained clearly
enough at yesterdoy's meeting of the Security
Cruncll and again‘at today’s meeting, I an
not in a position, as tho representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republice, to take
part ,in a discussion of the Iranian questicai
after the rejection of my proposal. For these
reasons I am unable to take part In the CounciJ_
meetings and I am leaving tho Council chamber#"''
Tlio Cjoncll took tiie departure of the Soviet delegation
rather Impassively, except for.Bymes who twisted around
in his seat to watch the delegation leave, then Hodgson
conplsincd that he had two different texts of the Egyptlaa
proposal, the discussion continued as if nothing had happened,
»

56; J U l . , p. 55,

57. I^U.. P. 53.
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After ttpolO£lzlns for the delay in handlns out the texts of
hia proposal» the Egyptian delegate stated his proposal
again#
«••(the Counoil) should ask the Iranian rep"
resentative to.come to tho Council table to
give his views an the question Of postponement;
then» if we think that postponemmt should not
be granted^ the Council canthke such action aa it
deem fit» which will be to ask him to produce
his doc^ents concemlns the substance of the
matter«-"°
Bymes noW took advantage of his earlier reservation
to speak following the vote on the î^ovlct proposal* He
had been prompted to speak, he said, when Gromyko had accused
» 59
him of wanting to get into the substance of the question*
The Soviet charge waa denied* Ho called attention to the
fact that it was he» Bymes» who had moved to amend the
Egyptian proposal to permit the Iranian delegate to be heard
on the subject of postponement*
Before the president put the Egyptian proposal to a
vote» hewanted to make sure that a decision could be taken
in the absence of the D#S*5#R* representative* He undei^
stood that it was a purely procedural question and that a
decision cculd be taken* Cadogan supported this view»
and the Egyptian proposal was pqt to a vote* Again the
58, ikifl... P. 59.
59,'IÊli.t PP« 59-60,

«
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vote was taken by a chow of hands; there were el^ht votes

60
In favor, end It was adopted*

The president then Inquired

If the Australian representative wanted a vote on his proposai, end Hjd&son replied In the affirmative. £ymcs,
however, nalntanled that the adoption of the Icyptlcn
propocal ruled out the Australian proposal, tut Hodcson
declared that his proposal was entirely different frora the
Egyptian and shculd bo voted on*

After considerable debate*

the president ruled that the Australian proposal was auto
matically dropped SB a result of the adoption of the Egyptian
proposal.

That ended the discussion.

At the president*©

Invitation, nusceln Ala, the representative of Iran, took
his place at the Council table.
17
In its twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-^seventh
meetings, the Security Coimcll was called upon a&aln to
settle the dispute between Iren and the Soviet Union. As
Boon as discussion began cn the Iranian question, the split
between the anti-Sovlct end Soviet blocs was opaln evident.
Even when the Australian delegate opposed the rest of the
antl-Sovlet bloc, he did not advocate the Soviet solution
for dispo^^ng of the question*
Under the leadership of Byrnes, the United States
delegation took a much more active part In the discussion
60. Ibid*, p. 6l*
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than it previously had done.

The principal antagonists

were now Byrnes and Gromyko, whereas in the London meetings
it had been Bevin and Vyshihsky.

With the support of the

other members, exclusive of Lange and Gromyko,

the United

States and United Kingdom delegates gave each other full
support.
The question of procedure continued to plague the
hearings of the Iranian charges.

Fully conscious that they

were setting precedents for future action,

the members

spent most of their time arguing procedural matters. They
had no rules to guide them, and therefore they had to feel
their way along as best they could.
The Council was also confronted with a new situation,
i.e.. the absence of one of its permanent members.
was the first time such a thing had happened.

This

But the Security

Council continued to discuss the Iranian question.

After

Gromyko walked out, the Council did not stop its work, nor
did it show any sign of weakness.

The continued discussion

dealt With procedural problems, however, and,
had been in a substantive stage,

if the question

it is doubtful whether the

Council could have passed any resolutions or even continued
discussion of the question.

Had the absence of the Soviet

representative been taken as a “veto” on a substantive matter
the.discussion of the question would have ceased.
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Fortunately for Iran, for the United Nation, and for
the antl-Sovlet bloc, the question vas procedural In nature.
The Iranian representative, Hussein Ala, was seated at
the Council table in spite of all that Gromyko had said
and done to prevent»it*

mm- Y6

CHAPTER 4.
THE BÏRHE3 EESOLUTION
X

After the Soviet representative's walkout In the twenty-*
seventh meeting, the president Quo Tal-Chl (China), Invited
Ala to take a place at the Council table. But when, because
of the lateness of the hour, the president asked for an adjourn
ment to 3 p.m. the next day, Byrnes replied that Ala then
and there should be permitted to meike his statement. The
president accepted the United States delegate's view. Thus,
with United States support, Ala presented his case, even at
that late hour.
The Iranian representative said that Is was *^wlth emotion
that I take my seat before the highest tribunal on earth,
1

wherein lie the hopes and aspirations of mankind." After
declaring that Xx%n firmly believed In the United Rations
and expected that Justice would be meted out by the Security
Council, Ala said that he knew of no agreement between the
disputants covering the matters listed In the Iranian complaint
to the Security Council. He was also positive In stating
that the Iranian prime minister particularly had requested
him to emphasize that, "the bringing of a dispute by one
1. Security Council Official Records.First Year, First
Series, No. 2., Hunter College, New York, (25^ïarch to 26
June, 1946), p. 62.
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Member of the United Batlona before the Security Council
should not be interpreted by other parties as an Inimical
2

act** Presenting a report from the Iranian prime: Minister,
Ala gave the Soviet proposals for settlement of the dis
pute* (l) that U*3*8.R. troopp remain in some parts of Iran
for an indefinite period; (2) that the Iranian government
reoognize the autoncsay of Azerbaijan within certain limits;
and (3) that a joint 0*S*S*R*-Iranian stock company be formed
with fifty-one per cent of the shares to be owned by the
U»S*S.R, and forty-nine per cent by Iran* The prime minister
had rejected these demands» and negotiations were deadlocked*
The Soviet Union had offered to remove its troops from
seme of the norhtem provinces bpt would leave troops in
4
the others “until the situation had been clarified»" After
lodging a protest with the Soviet government in which he
cited the pertinent articles of the tri-partite treaty,
the Iranian prime minister had informed the Soviets that the
British had withdrawn their troops in accordance with the
treaty. He also said that the Soviet Union was contradicting
Itself, since it had said it Intended to conform to the treaty
but in practice had not done so, Ala had been Instructed to
2* Jb,id., p* ^3*
3* Ibid»» pp# 64-65.
4* Ibid», p. 65.
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present the dispute to the Council for a decision in
accordance with the powers and duties of the Council#
Byrnes interrupted at this point to request the Iranian
delegate to limit himself to the question of postponement
5
rather than go into the substance of the matter# But
Ala thought it necessary to present the above views# Byrnes
again said that the Iranian representative should limit
himself to the question of postponement, and the president
agreed with him. Both Byrnes and the president seemed afraid
that if the discussion got into the substance of the question,
the absence of the Soviet representative could then have
an effect of a "veto* on any action taken by the Council
in respect to the question before It,
At this point, Lange reminded the Council that he had
raised the same point as the United States representative
and had been ignored# He hoped in the future that the
6
smaller nations would be given more consideration#
Since he opposed postponement and wanted to give the
pertinent facts of the case, Ala said that he had to pre
sent his argument in a logical sequence. Otherwise the
Council could not appreciate the Iranian position. As he
5. iÈlâ..# p. 66.
6.

p* 67.
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did not vfmt to augseat how the Iranian delegate should
present his oase* hut thinking It would be heZffdll It be
asked a few questions^ Byrnes Inquired whether Ala was
7
authorized to agree to a postponement* He also wanted to
know If there had been any change In Ala*a Instructions
since he had filed the matter^ and wondered what Ala thought
were the dangers Involved In postponing the matter. Agreeing
with Byrnes, Hassan Pasha, (Egypt), thought that the pre
sentation of the Iranian viewpoint took too much time*
Having received no instructions to agree to a postpone
ment, Ala enumerated his reasons opposing onet (l) that Iran
was suffering from Interference In Its Internal affairs;
(2) that demands were being made upon Iran which were Incon
sistent with Its sovereignty and territorial Integrity;
and (3) that the presence of foreign troops were a heavy
8
burden on the people* Since Iran would suffer still more
were the matter postponed, he requested that the Council
take up the matter Immediately.
Lange then ^Jsegan what was to be a lengthy téte-k-tëte
9
between himself and Ala In the meetings to come. Lange
7* Ibid., p. 87•
8. Ibid.. pp* 68-69.
9# Ibid.. p. 69.
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Inquired If Ale had received InstructIota to oppose a delay*
After claiming that Ala had omitted a very Important point#
I.e.* ^at Soviet troops were being withdrawn, Lange wanted
to know If Ala had received any official Instructions relative
to the withdrawal of troops from Iran* The Polish rep-*
resentatlve quoted Gromyko** statement that the Iranian
prime minister had acknowledged the fact that the ü*S*S*R*
troops were being withdrawn and that Ghavam did not want
outside pressure to be exerted In the negotiations between
the dlaputauats* Be wondered if the Iranian delegate could
confirm the truth of the Soviet representative’s statœaent*
%ary of listening to the various statements and
arguments for a number of hours# Hassan Pasha asked If the
hearing could be postponed until the next day# The president
agreed to this suggestion and adjourned the meeting.
In this twenty-seventh meeting, the Council had seated
the Iranian delegate after the Soviet walkout, and had gone
on with the dlscusslm of the question* Even so. It was all
too noticeable that the members,especially the United
States representative and the president, tried to prevent
the discussion fz*om getting Into the substance of the Iranian
question* Almost nothing was said about the Soviet absence
and Its effect on the Council#

tm
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II
The tveDtj-el£^th meeting was not held, however, until
Maroh 29m A&alntha president invited the Iranian dele&ate
to take his place at the Council table, and the tëte-^^tëte
between Ala and Lan^e continued*
By saying that he had Instructions that were broad
enpoah to permit him to take such action aa he deemed neces
sary to protect his country, Ala firmly rebutted Lange’s
10

suggestion that he had no Instructions to oppose a delay*
Jin answer.to.Lange*8 second question, Ala definetely stated
%is had:no:^information^ LOfflGlal'pr:other#ISe^tbroorroberate
the Soviet contention that Soviet troops were evacuating
Iranian territory* Moreover, ha did not believe that Ghavam
bad made any statement to the effect that outside pressure
should not be brought to bear on the Sovlet-iranlan nego
tiations»
Referring to the absence of the Soviet representative,
Ala regretted that Gromyko was not present to "correct at
first hand any misunderstanding on my part of the position
11

of his Qovcrnnent*"

Gromyko’s remark that at the negotiations

in Moscow between Iran and the Soviet Union, an essential
phase of the negotiations, had been concluded was not tsue»
10* Ibid## pp* 71*T2*
II#

Id*# p* 72*

-
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Hothlns had been settled^ and at best Ala could only
agree that there had been a "misunderstanding,* The
Iranian government wanted Soviet "assuranoea" {to accompany
the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran) to be communicated
to the Council, and these "assurances* must Include a
guarantee that the Soviet Imlom wmild not go back on Its
12

work In evacuating Its troops.
Because he was confused on one point. Hassan Pasha
asked Ala what was the nature of the negotiations between
the Soviet Union and Iran. Ala replied that the Iranian
constitution forbade the prime minister to "enter into
any negotiations cmceming the evacuation of the country;
the withdrawal of the troops is In no way connected with
any negotiations. The withdrawal of the troops inust be
. .
13
unconditional.
It was true that the prime minister, with
the consent of.parliament,.! could enter Into'negotiationà'
other than for the evacuation of troops. But the fourteenth
parliament had expired, and the new parliament could not be
elected until foreign troops were withdrawn.
On this point, Ala was seemingly inconsistent, since
Ohavam had gone to Moscow for the express purpose of trying
to settle the dispute by negotiations, emd Iran in presenting
12. Ibjd^, p. T2#
1 % Ibii., p, 73.
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its ease to the Council claimed to conform to Article 35»
which stated that countries should try to settle their dis*
putes 'X>jpeaceful

negotiation* Lange was quick to catch

Ala in this inconsistencyÎ
ÎÏOW I read in the newspapers» and I think
it is an established fact, that the Prime Minister
of Iran was in Moscow, carrying out some negoti
ations or, if we must not use that term* convert
satioae, while USSR troops still were on Iranian
soil and I want to find out whether he broke the
law and did negotiate or whether his purpose in
going to Moscow was,, for Instance, merely to attend
a *vodka party %**14
Contradicting the Polish delegate, Ala argued that
Ghavam had gone to Moscow in accordance with the January 30
resolution of the Security Council* The object of Ghavam*s
trip had been to request negotiations with the Soviet gov^
ernment oonoeming the dispute* The "vodka party** was
explaihed this ways
He (Ghavam) was wined and dined and plenty of
caviar also were served to him, but he stood
firm for the independence of his country and»
the essential rights of Iran and he did not
yield vn a single point and maintained his
attitude*15
When the president Inquired if there were other questions,
Ala wanted to k n m if he should retire frœa his place at
the table, but the president allowed him to remain* Ala
had stated his ease clearly and with great vigor* Although
14. Ibid.. p. 73.
15. Ibid.. p. 74.
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a frail blrdllke person barely five feat tall, he ably

defended his case, more or.less successfully answered the
«questions put to him, and adroitly handled Lange *a persisTgAfT
heckling# Using the Bevln resolution as a shield, he cleared
up the question of the prime minister's being able to nego
tiate with the U,3.S.R« However, he did not refer to the
negotiations prior to the Bevln resolution, but he seemed
to eatlslfy the members who questioned him.
Byrnes proposed at this point to postpone the discussion
for a few days. He suggested that:
...the President of the Council request the
Secretary-General to endeavour to obtain from
the USSR Government and the Iranian Government
through their representatives and report to the
Council at,Its meeting of Tuesday, 2 April,
the existing status of negotiations between the
two Governments, and particularly to ascertain
from the representatives of the two Governments
end report whether oqnot the reported withdrawal
of troops is conditional upoo the conclusion of
agreements between the two Governments on other
subjects.lG
Byrnes superficially seemed to be following somewhat the
earlier proposal of the Australian representative, but Byrnei':
suggestion was made after the Iranian representative had been
heard. Byrnes did notwant the presence of Soviet troops In
Iran to influence the Iranian government In Its dealings
with the Soviet Union, andcveiLitHt rccomme/isJeJthe withdrawal
of*Soviet troops, the withdrawal could not be done In a
substantially shorter period of time thM wae given by the
16. I^ ., pp# 75-76#
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the Soviet Union for its troop withdrawal* Byraea not oaiy

wanted the U*S#S.&* to guarantee the evacuation of its
troops, but also he tried to keep the^ Council away from
cmieidering the substantive aspects#

In the latter case,

Gromyko’s **absence® aight well constitute a *veto*.
The long-silent‘Càdogan now endorsed the Byrnes proposal*
However, he wanted to change Byme'e' wording from "USSR
.

troops oould not be withdrawn from Iran’
ih a substantially
a
shorter period® to "the withdrawal of all USSR troops
would not be completed in a substantially shorter period of
17
time#® Byraea accepted the Gadogan "amendment,® although
18
he pointed out that he (Byrnes) had made no "resolution#®
Since the Byr/vss suggestion was based on his own, Hodgson
(Australia^ quite naturally supported it# But he wanted a
new time limit and suggested either April 3rd or 4th as
19
the date for the two parties to reply# Because he had supported
the Australian proposal earlier, Lange (Poland) now supported
the United States suggestion, end even went so far as to
20
oongrstulate Byrnes for his resolution# And after an "AlphonsfGaston* parody between van Bieffens (Hetherl&nde) and Byrnes
over who had the floor, van Eleffens eventually got around
IT.

76*

18.

P. 76,

19. lUl*. PP. 76-77.
20. itia.. p. 78.

to endorsing the Byrnei*' Bueeestlon, Including the April
2 date*
Byrnes, In reply to Hodgson, Lange, and v&h Kleffens,
took Issue with the Polish and Australian representative's
viewpoint on the date the reports were due.

April 2 per

mitted plenty of time, to get the information needed; in
fact, "That will allow four days, ninety-six hours, ’
between
theadoption of this resolution and the time for the report*

21

Castillo Zlajera (Mexico) supported the United States
delegate’s view on the date of April 2, but Bonnet (France)
22

thought that April 3 would be better* He also pointed out
that the time in Eastern Europe was a day ahead of the time
in New York, and that time would be needed to decipher
messages, and so on# Countering this viewpoint, Byrnes re
marked Î
My good friend from France says that while
29 inarch here today, in Eastern Europe it
is 30 î'îaroh* Well, 96 hours from now, on
2 April, it will be 3 April in Moscow* So'
my friend get what he wants.23
The discussion had bogged down on a seemingly minor
point# As everyone had to speak hia mind, the delegates
argued for sometime over an issue that could have been settled
quickly by the president had proper rules of order existed*
Even Lange, one of the worst offenders, declared that an
21*

P. 79*

22* Ibid.* )?P* 79-80*

23* Ibid.. P. 80*
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that an outside observer vould think that all the Security
Council talked about were dates.

Aa for himself, he pre

ferred the later date out of courtesy to a member who ^un
fortunately" was not present, a
to prepare his case.

member who needed more time

Very earnestly Lansa pleaded*

How I understand that In court procedureand we hav^ many eminent Jurists here, such as
the Secretary
State of the United States and
the representative of Eorpt— It is usually con
sidered policy when the counsel of one of the
parties required some time to prepare his brief,
to give him that time.24
Perhaps flattered by the remark about his being an eminent
Jurist, Byrnes remarked that If more time were needed when
the reports were due, he thought that It could be allowed*
25
^
'
Bedro Lm Velloso (Brazil), spoke up for the first time

to congratulate Byrnes, to say that he had no preference
it

about the date, and to show the United States that Brazil
26
was on its side.

In contrast to Velloso, Hassan Pasha

talked about a number of things before he got around to
the main point.

He chiefly complimented Byrnes for the

24. ,
Ibld.p p. 81.
25. Pedro Leao Velloso (1887-1947) was secretary to the
Brazilian delegation to the Parla.peace conference. He
was secretary-general of the ministry Of foreign affairs,
1941-44 end chairman of the Brazilian delegation to the
ÜHCIO, 1945 and the General Assembly and the Security
Council, 1946.
26. Security Council Offlolal Records. First Year, First
Series, Ho, 2,, p. ël.
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good humor of the meeting and because **he reconciled all
the views which we have expressed and put thea Into the
27
right words.^ As for the point of the discourse (the date
the reports, were due)* Haasan Fasha supported Bonnet *B view.
The "président without further.oonsultlns the members,
set April 3 ss the date on which the Information from the
disputants vas due on the assumption that the Byrnes suggestion
23

had been unanimously endorsed. But another confusing pro
cedural issue was brought up by Castillo ::ajera who wanted
the phrase “I suggest that* taken out Of the paragraph
that contained

suggest that the president of the Security

Council should request the Secretary-General to endeavour
to obtain from the USSR Covernment...** Castillo lîajera
29
asserted that Byrnes suggestion had becfxne a resolutlœi.
The president then had to correct the idea that the suggestion
had become a résoluticm. It had not. Since no vote bad
been token on Eyrnei*' suggestion (even though it had been
adopted unanimously) it therefore remained a suggestion
' 30
and not a resolution. The meeting was then adjourned by the
27* Ibii*. P. 81.
28. Ibid.. p. 82.
29# Ibid.. p. 82.
38."^JEkjLâ## p# 82.
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presldcatV'
■without being either a reeolution or a proposal, the
Byraea suggestion had taken the force of law in requiring
the two disputants to turn in"reports by April 3* Here was
something new in the Council’s procedure, since formerly a
"suggestion** or a "statement" had been either a "resolution"
or a "proposal" before it was voted on* In this oase, how
ever, a "suggestion" served the purpose desired, and no
argument was made against it.
Ill
The twenty-ninth meeting of the Security Council vas
held on April 3, and in thia meeting, as in the twentyeighth, the representative of the Soviet Union wasebsent*
At the meeting, the Council concerned itself with the reports
received by the secretary-general fro® the parties concerned
in the Iranian dispute*• The president invited Ala to be
31
seated and then read a letter fron the secretary-general*
The secretaty-general informed the Council that he
had sent letters to the Iranian and Soviet governments
and had received replies la return* He enclosed a letter
froa Chavaa stating that Ala had been and was now the
32
accredited representative of Iran* Gromyko a letter stated
31* Ibid**-*PP# G3"^4*
32* jTbi,
d*p P*‘64*

that negotlotlane had led to an underatandlne: between Iron
4

^

*•

‘l

4»-

and the Soviet Union for the renewed withdrawal of troop*
on flaroh r.4# Gromyko reminded the Coancll thct he had Infdrmed It of thia agreement at the tweaty-alxth meeting*
41&*8 letter dealt In a more complex fashion regarding the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran* There had been and
*
there oould be no negotiations* Instead, ^la Informed the
Council, the Soviet government had presented the Iranlsai
33
prime minister with tîiree memoranda* One declared that
Soviet troops would be withdrawn over a five or six weeks
period beginning }kirch 24* No ae/vtlon was made of any con
dition attached to the evacuation* The second memorandum
dealt with the foF;Msti(?N ol*a joint Iranlan-U.S,S.R* oil
company, end the third memorandum suggested an autonomous
Azerbaijan,

On condition that no unfomseen circumstances

should occur, the uovlet embassador to Iran had Informed
Ghavam orally that the Soviet Union would evacuate Iran
and Intimated that IT agreement could be reached on the
second end third memoranda, •‘there would be no further cause
34

for anxiety and no unforeeen circumstances would take place*"
This latter statement had not been clarified by the
Soviet government, but It seemed clear that the U*S.S*H, was
33# Ibid., pp* 85-66,

Sÿ. Tbld.. a. 83,
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delajrlns Its eTacuation of troops fran Iran in the hope of
Induolns Iran to make concessions concerning^ oil and Azer
baijanian autoncany»

Ghavam Informed Ala that Azerbaijan

was a domestic problem of the Iranian government, and the
province was regulated by the Iranian constitution and the
law of provincial councils#

The formation of an oil company

would have to be submitted to the Iranian parliament for
consideration.
been reached

îleanwhlle no understanding or agreement had
But the Iranian government wanted an agree

ment, at least on the evacuation of Soviet troops, and
Ala assured the Council)

In closing permit me to repeat that, in
referring these disputes to the Council, the
Iranian Government is animated by no feeling
ci hostility toward the USSR. It is our hope
that the Council will find a Just solution which
will promote friendly relations in the future,36
Byrnes wanted to read the Soviet and Ironlan reports,
but he asked Ala what action should be taken by the Council
with regard to the questions submitted by his government to
the Council.

Ala replied that if the Soviet Union would

be willing to withdraw the condition concerning "unforseen
circumstances" noted in the withdrawal of troops and would
Giva to the Council a guarantee that Soviet troops would be

35* -Ib.id., p* 86»

35* Ibidmf P* 8$#
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ifltMr^wa .by JSa;f.6 at thô:latèôt# tbea:Iz^a vould .notrproea
'
37
the.natteroenÿfûrther'^ttthl» partloularrtlm@*_ r^la vantod
* *•
the matter left bn the agenda, however, because he had
had experience with Soviet dealln£Q before.
Toolve the Cvunoll members time to read the letters and
reports, the president adjourned the acetlng until the next
—'
Î
day. This was one of the shortest meetings on the Iranian
dispute and dealt mostly with the reading of the reports
from the two disputants.

The dlsscuslon of the reports

would follow In the next meeting, after* they had been read
and analysed by the members.
XT

The thirtieth meeting of the Security Council opened
at Hintsr College bnApril 4, 1946. After the president
had Invited Ala to take his place at the Council table,
Byrnes offered a draft resolution for the considerationof the Council. Elswas the most Important eIngle notion
to be made since there-submlttence of the dispute to the
Council. Ihe complete text of the resolution read!
The Security Council.
Tnhinr. note of the etaten ints by the
Iranian représentative that the Iranian appeal
to the Council arises from the presence of CSSE
troops In Iran and their continued presence
there bcyohd the date stipulated for their with
drawal In the Trl-partite Treaty of 29 January
1942;
37# mS.*é P# 87#

Taking note of the replies dated 3 April of
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the Iranian Government pursuant
to the request of the Secretary-General for Infor
mation as to the state of the negotiations betvreen
the two Governments and as to whether the with
drawal of USSR troops from Iran Is conditional
uppQ agreement on other subjects;
And In particular taking note of and relying
upon the assurances of the USSR Government:
That the withdrawal of USSR troops from
Iran has already commenced;
That It Is the intention of the USSR Gov
ernment to proceed with the withdrawal of Its
troops as rapidly as possible;
That the USSR Government expects the with
drawal of all USSR troops frcwithe whole of Iran
to be completed within five or six weeks; and
That the proposals under negotiation between
the Iranian Government and the USSR Government
are not connected with the withdrawal of USSR
troops;
Being solicitions to avoid any possibility
of the presence of USSR troops In Iran being used
to influence the course of the negotiations be
tween the Governments of Iran and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics; and
Reco.gnl^lng that the withdrawal of all USSR
troops from the whole of Iran cannot be completed
in a substantially shorter period of time that
within which the USSR Government has declared it
to be its intention to complete such withdrawal;
Resolvea that the Council defer further
proceedings of the Iranian appeal until 6 Kay>
at which time the USSR Government and the Iranian
Govemiaent are requested to report tc^he Council
whether the withdrawal of all USSR troops from
the whole of Iran has been oaapleted and at which
time the Council shall consider what. If any,
further proceedings aâ the Iranian appeal are
required;

w

I*

Provided, however, that If In the meantime
either the USSR Government or the Iranian Gov-*
ernment or any member of the Security C^unoll
reporta to the Secretary-General any develop
ments which may retard or threaten to retard
the prompt withdrawal of USSR troops froa Iran^
In accordance with the assurances uf the USSR
to the Cc^jtncll, the Secretary-General shall
Immediately call to the attention of the Council
such reports, which shall be considered as the
first Item on the a&enda.5&
After congratulatins Ike £reatpowers In letting Iran
state Its case and In keeping the question on the agenda
In case something went Wrong with the negotiations. Hassan
39
Pasha endorsed the resolution* He coamended the U#G*5#R*
for complying with the decision of the Security Council
by submitting Its report on April 3# Velloso (Brazil)
agreed with Byrnes^ proposal, and he complimented the Council
for doing Its duty In hearing the case and inviting the
40
Iranian representative to sit with the Council* In support
ing the Resolution,Cadogan went along with the last two
members* He thought that were the resolution adopted, the
Council would be taking the first step towards a peaceable
41
end amicable settlement of the dispute* Even the Polish
35. Itia.. pp.88-89.
39. m a ., p. 90.
40. Ibid.. pp. 90-91»
41. lÈil., p. 91.
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42
representative (Lanse) agreed with the resolution*
Xt 8003 becaiae apparent that all the members wanted to
say a few words about the resolution and about things In
general* There was a feeling In the air, as when the
Bevla resolution was adopted, that the Council soon would
be done with the Iranian «question, and that it had done Its
duty towards Iran*
Predicting thftt the Council was on the “right road**
and It must keep on this road to achieve a lasting peace,
Castillo Najera (Kexlco) hoped that in the future all
members of the Council, permanent or non-permenent, would
unite In their efforts to secure the peaceful settlement
43
of disputes* Bonnet (France) supported the Byrnes proposal
and observed that the Security Council not only had done
Its duty but also that the differences of opinion Battled
44
by the Council were over matters of procedure*
Now was heard the first and only discordant note In
V
this happy atmosphere* Hodgson (Australia) said that
Australia stood for tlie principle that the Council should
make no decision without a careful, orderly, and methodical
examination of all the facts end Information relating to
the dlGpute.80 89 to enable the Council to act “as a high
42, Ibid.. pp* 91-92*
43. Ibid.. P, 92*
44* Ibid.* pp. 92-93.

li. 96 •*

45
Jtidiclal tribunal would &ot#" Slaoe It covered only the
evacuation of Soviet troops from 1#^anIan soil, and did not
refer to the other evidences of Soviet interference In the
Internal affairs of Iran, Bjmnk* resolution was a hasty one.
The Council, indeed, had gone straight from discussing a
procedural question of postponenent to a final resolution
without ever having decided to Investlgete the real dispute.
Sot at any time had the Cj'uncll heard complete statements
froa either disputent. He brought the absence of the
Soviet representative Into his argument when he said:
We deprecate the fact that the represent-*
atlve of the USSR left the Council during dla*'eussions of procedural questions and beforo the
facts or merits of the case vez*e even discussed,
thus prejudicing the work, the efficiency and
the authority of the Counc11,46
Hodgson further contended that the arrangements made outside
theCouncil had

lowered the prestige and weakened the authority

of the Council,He declared that he

would abstain la any

Vote on the Uymes resolution, and he reserved the right
to call for a complete investigation If the clrcumstancea
47
warranted It at any time. No one eei^ously contested
Hodgson^s argument, tut It was apparent, however, that he
45# Ibid,. J?. 95#
46, Ibid., p. 95,
47# IbM^. P# 95,
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approached the puhetantlve aspect of the questloa and
Ignored the wishes of the big powers, especially the United
States and the United Kingdoa, to avoid entangling them
selves, Iran, and the Security Council with the Soviet
Union** use of the "veto." Both van Kieffens and Quo
Tai-Ohl appreciated the Hodgson position, but they thought
that there was no us© In dealing with difflo%(_JLtiGS which
did not need to be discussed or solved and that executive
meeting,

private meetings held- outside the Council,
A3

helped to smooth things out# This was ©specially helpful
In procedural matters* and nothing in the Charter prevented
these meetings, nor did It say anything about all Council
meetings being held in public#
A vote was now taken and the resolution passed with
A9

nine votes in favor and one abstention (Australia)# Ala
expressed his thanks, but he wanted It understood, however*
that the question should remsla bn the agenda end could
50
be brought up for consideration at any tise*
V
’In the twenty-seventh meeting, the Iranian represent
ative, Ala, when seated at the Council t&ble said much the
same a* his predecessor, Taqizsdeh# The complaint was the
48. Ibld.f pp.' 95-96,
49. Ibid;, Pt 97.
50. Ibid.,- PP. 97-99.

Bam«t that Soviet troops were still In Iran, that Soviet
Intervention la Iranian affairs oontinned, and that no
results had been achieved from attempted negotiations,
Co the other hand* with the U.5*S*R* representative absent
from the Council, Lange the Polish delegate, presented the
Soviet case. He followed the Soviet line that there had
been negotiations between the disputants and that results
had been achieved,
Ala was asked several times to limit his remarks to
procedural matters and not involve the Council In a dis
cussion of the substantive aspect of the question, Byrnes
and fluo Tai-Chl were especially insistent about this because
of their fear of a Soviet "veto** on a substantive If&ue.
Gromyko’s absence was referred to only a few times,
end, although Hodgson (Australia) once pointedly remarked
about the absence, no one else took it up. However, when
the Soviet delegate met the April 3 deadline. In conformance
with the Council request, many observers were suprlsed, and
it was hoped that the United Hâtions In the future might
have even more control over the policies of a great p<wer.
In assuming the leadership of the anti-Sbvlet bloc,
Byrnes carried on much of the discussion and was the dominant
personality in the Council’s hearing of the Iranian dispute.
In trying to meet the Soviet Union halfway by not rushing
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the withdrawal of Its troops, ha avoided the substantive
aspect of the question. During the aeetlng and after the
adoption of the Byrnes resolution, optimism prevailed,
since all that the Soviet- representative had to do was to
drop the phrase "unforseen circumstances," end the Iranian
delegate would be satisfied.
After expressing his appreciation for the adoption
of his resolution, Byrnes referred b the committee of experts
which then was drafting a set of rules for Council pro
cedure. The Council must not become a "slave** to any
particular method of accomplishing the objective of the
Charter, JUâ*» the maintenance of world peace. He expressed
the viewpoint of the Anglo-Saxon tradition of keeping fluid
both written constitutions and written laws. The Soviet
viewpoint on the other hand, was to be found In Gromyko’s
insistence on the strictest interpretation of the Charter
as it was written, and not to have It changed by unwritten
rules of practice or usuage.
While the rest of: the Council was content to leave
negotiations to the parties concerned and was satisfied
with the information the parties chose to report, Hodgson
wanted to investigate very throughly the facts of the case.
In spite of the arguments of the rest of the Council, the
Australien delegate maintained his viewpoint throughout
the discussions.
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The Iranian representative realized that ho would
have to accept just about anything that the Council had to
offer* Therefore he waa pleased to see the majority of
the Council support the Byrnes resolution and the question
remain on the agenda* Rowever, Byrnes* resolution touched
on only one aspect of the Iranian ccsaplaint, tx'oop evacuation*
and not on Soviet Intervention In Iranian Internal affairs*
In this respect the Council avoided the issue, as the
Australian representative Intimated*

It was thought by

some members that if the troops were withdrawn. Inter*
ventIon In Internal affairs would ceaee. The Byrnes re
solution was looked upon as perhaps the necessary step
to settle the question and maintain world peace*

- loi CHAPTER 5*
THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IRANIAH CCî^îPLAlirr
i.
The thirty-first meetln? of the Security Couacll with
Gromyko In attendance* was held ot Hunter College on April
9f 194S# It was originally Intended at this neetlng GNly
to draft provisional rules of procedure as revised by the
Council’s committee of experts, tut after the adoption of
these rules* the president* Quo Ta1-Chi (China), brought
up the Iranian questloh# After stating that there were
two letters In his possession from the disputants In the
Iranian case* the president remarked thit he also had two
f
communications from the Polish representative relative to
.1
the SpanlfihTquestion* Having: presented the provisional
rule of procedure that the Council had to have three days’
notice'"before It could meet to dlsdusa new communications,
the president referred to the Council’s emergency power
and said that the Council could meet at any time*
Cadogan brought up rule S of the Security Council
procedure 5
The provisional agenda, for a meeting shall be
communicated by the Secretary-General to the
representatives on the Security Council at
least three days before the meeting, but In
urgent clxvsumstances It may be communicated 2
simultaneously with the notice of the meeting*
1* Security Council Official Records. First Year, First
Series, Supplement 2îo*2,* Hunter College* the Bronx,
Hew York* pp* 46-47#
2, pecuritv Council Official Records* First Year, First
Series, Ho*2*. Hunter College,
York, (25 îîarch 1946
to 26 June 1946), p* 108*
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Since the Iranian question was still cm the agenda, would
the CouzKSil have to put the letters from the U*B*S«R« and
Iran on the agenda formally, or would they already be cm
the agenda, was Cadogan’s inquiry. The president thought
that the Soviet and Iranian letters dealt with a matter
already on the agenda but that the Polish letters were ne&
material and would require three days^ notice,
After hearing Byrnes statement in which he said, "In
response to the president's inquiry as to the pleasure of
the Council regarding the time of the next meeting, I
wish to make clear that I am preparedto speak for the
United States on these subjects at any time, now, tonorrow,
or three days frc«i now," the president decided to hold the
4
next meeting at 3 p*m, the next afternoon»
Of the opiniCHfi that an emergency meeting should not
be held unless it were really on emergency meeting. Bonnet
(France) wanted the president's oplhion as to the exact
status of the meeting called for the next day. The president
qualified himself by saying that the meeting was, ",. .not
exactly an emergency meeting, but m e on matters concerning
5
urgent circumstances," The president's first suggestion to

3, m m . # P* 119,
4, Ibid.. p, 3L20,
5,. Ibid,^ p, 120,
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have the eecretary-general notify the Coimoll when the
next meeting would be was the most acceptable to Velloso
(Brazil), At this point* Cadogan pointed out that the
Council had just now adopted rule 8 and within a few minutes
7

had pRoceded to break It*

Taking a firm stand on his proposal to have the Iranian
question discussed the next day* the president maintained
that If the question were not discussed then it could not
be hntll the next week, as circumstances forbade it. But
he got little help In trying to decide a date for the
I*

<

next meeting* except* suprisingly enough* from Gromyko who
said* “If the Security Council considers that Fflday is a
suitable day for the consideration of this question* I am
prepared to agree; If the Council considers Saturday a
suitable day* I am prepared to agree upon Saturday; If any
8
other day Is suggested, I am prepared to agree#* The
Egyptian delegate suggested Saturday at 10 or 11 a.m#,
but the president* now more than a little piqued* ignored
HasBan Pasha completely and said that the secretary-general
would notify the Council when the next meeting would be#
He then adjourned the meeting#
8# -lbid#* p # 120#
7. Ifeiâ.» p. 121.
6* Itld#a p« 121#
9 . 2 S M .»

p . 122.

- 104 r

The letters referred to by the président were from
>■
Grmyko (April 6) sad Ala (April 9), Ala's letter merely
consisted of an acknowledgment of the Soviet letter sent
to Ala by the secfetary-generai* The situation in Iran
remained the same* i.e.. nothing had changed, and the
10

negotiations bad accmpliahed nothing new,
*
?'
Inhis letter to the president, Gromykodenounced
as Illegal theresolution of April 4 whichgave Iran until
"'
,5 ■
11
May $ to report on the progress of the situation. Again
citing Article 34, Gromyko flarly asserted that no threat
' 1
to world peace existed and that an understanding had been
.

.

reached regarding the withdrawal of troops• As he had done
in the March 18 meeting, he again requested that the Iranian
question be removed from the agenda. Although the Soviet
letter was no more than a restatement of Soviet policy, it
should be noted that the letter vîas dated April 6, four
days before Gromyko said, he would discuss the question.
By bringing up th® matter before the 10th, and during his
absence from the jOounoll, the Soviet delegate contradicted
himself, since he had said that under no circumstances could
'!

he discuss the q|Uest,ion before April 10.
The discussIdn,
/ '"/ iover
\ setting a date for the next meeting
well demonstrated .how the 0wine11 often found itself involved
'f /
in prolonged ajnd nontindal bickering over apparently trivial
r
A
10. Security
Offlolal ReooNs. First Year, First
Series, Supplemoi^t ,No, 2*, pp, 4o--47*
\

11. Ibid.. pp 46-47.

- 105' ^

prooedurel'fd^oblems. At the same time, hoifever. It must be
remembered that the'Oouneil was settlmg; Important precedents,
precedent* that would determine Its procedure for years

■
>

to oome*

Moreover, and most significantly, the delate In

the thirty-first meeting, although apparently settling nothing.
Bay well have changed the entire outcome of the Iranian
dispute*

For within a week, another Iranian letter was

to explode like a bomb in the Security Council and outdate
Entirely the Gromyko and Ala letters mentioned in this meeting*
II
The'thirty-second meeting of the Security Council was
not held until April 15 as the president had warned# The
president immediately proceeded to road a'letter from the
Iranian representative which caused consternation among
12
the Council members# Ala wrote that his government had
Instructed him to make the following statement#
As a result of the signature of the agreement
between the Iranian Government and the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, It
has been agreed that the Red A m y evacuate all
rerSian territory by 6 2lay 1946# The Iranian
Government has no d-ubt that this agreement
will be carried out, but at the samC' time has
not the right to fix the course the Security
Council should take#^3
12# Security Cou.-icil Official Records. First Year, First
Series, 3o#2#, pp#:322-123#
13#

Ibid.. p#

123#
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Th« Iranian representative Included In hla letter the text
of a telegram he had received that mornings
In view of the fact that the USSR Ambassador
had again today» 14 April, categorically reiterated
that the uncondltl<%ial evacuation of Iranian terr
itory by the Red Army will be completed by 6 I4ay
1946, It la necessary that you Imnedately Infora
the Security Oouncll that the Iranian Go^x^rnrnent
has complete trust In the word and pledge of
the USSR Government and for this reason withdraws
Its complaint from the Security Gouncll*14
This shocking statement set off a heated discussion
that soon was to involve the question of the Security Council*#
right to control Its own agenda, a statement by the secretarygeneral that questioned the Security Council's jurisdiction
In the Iranian dispute, a second Soviet walkout,

sl

momentary

split between Poland end the U.S*S.R., en alignment of
Trance with Poland and the Soviet Union, ea well ae bitter
debate among the members.
Aa soon as the president finished, Gromyko, In an

acid **I told you so" mood, oondemmed the Council for taking
action on the Iranian case after the Soviet Union had told
15
the Council that an agreement had been reached. The U#3#S*R*
oould not disregard lightly the decision taken on April 4
during the absence of the ^oviet delegation. Agreeing that
the Council's action would have been justified were the
14. Ibid,,'p. 123.
15. Ibid.. pp. 123-126,
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situation In Iran a threat to world peace, Gronylio called
the Council*a attention to the "eztrocely la^ortant fact*
that the Cecùrity Council could not lake action on a dls:^te
unle&B loth parties concerned were heard. And Gronyko vas
not present when the resolution of April 4 %os adopted#
(Groajko seeneJ to forget that he was a party of the dispute,
that he had been hoard often chough, and that hie absence
was entirely voluntary)#
Questioning the legality of hairing the dispute on
the agenda, aa Vyshinsky had done before hln Gromyko pointed
out that the Covlet Union had so legitimate and substantial
a case that ^vca the Iranian goi/emment now had wlthdra^m
Its complaint# In positive words he asserted th6tthe task
Of the Council now was to *h'ote* the removal of the Iranian
16
question from the agenda* Everything else had been settled

.

and all that reaaincd to terminate the formal aspects of
the IIranian complalrit was to ”note*’lts removal.
/dthough he was "naturally* pleased to learn of the
agreement between the disputants, Stfrttinlus, who had
replaced Lymes In the Council, asserted thot the April 4
17
action in the Council was legal and proper#
(He quoted

17. Itl).. pp. 126-127,

*•

10^ **

11

Article 2p paragraph 4 of the Charter to support his argument)*
Confronting Gromyko with the two reasons why the Council had
acted as It did on April 4* Stettlnlus declared, that the
Council had accepted not only the assurances of the U»S.5.R.
that It would withdraw Its troops froa Iran but also the
willingness of the Iranian government to accept these assur
ances*
In direct opposition to Grœnyko* Stettinlus saw no
reason why the Iranian question should be taken off the
agenda until 2îay 6 when the Iranian report was due as prowled
In the April 4 resolution* He hoped that on Ilay 6* If the
report from Iran were favorable, the question could be
19
-'
dropped fràta the founoll agenda* Gtettlniua suspected that
Iran’s sudden reversal resulted from pressure placed on the
Iranian govemmeat by either Soviet authorities In Iran
of by the continued presence of Soviet troops* He prefared
a "wait and see" policy*

Van Kleffena also defended the Council action of
April 4 and objected to dropping the Iranian case from the
18, Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United ITatlons Charter;
"All Kembera In order to ensure to all of then the rights
«bd benefits resulting from membership, SJé/tlL fulfil
good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance
with the present Charter*"
19# Security Council^ Officiel Records. First Year, First
Series,
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20
agenda# Cadogan, too, by supporting the legality of the
Council action, denied Gromyko's arguments for dropping
the matter from the agenda. As usual, Cadogan backed the
United States and again demonstrated the solidarity of
21
opinion between the two governments on this question.
Insisting that he would not agree to the removal of
the question fram the agenda until a report had been received
from the Iranian representative on I!ay 6, Hodgson maintained
that the decision of the majority of the Council had been
fully In line with the Charter# He also wondered what
had happened to the first part of the original Iranian
ooaplalnt, l.e.^the Interference of Soviet authorities In
Iranian Internal affairs. Since no mention had been made
of this In the Iranian request for the removal of Its
complaint from the agenda, he wanted to know whether this
also had been settled#

He summed up the position of the

members opposing the dropping of the question by saying*
Statements by one or another Individual
member of the Council do not absolve the Council
from its duty to Investigate and to decide
ascertained facts#22
20, Ibid., pp# 127-128#
21# Ibid.. pp# 128-120#
22# Ibid.. p# 122#
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"’
fthile â£reelne that the losloal thine to Co would
be

to drop the case frosi Uie agenCa In the Xi£ht of the

present oirouiastances, Velloso (Brazil) thought another

matter had to be considered that prevented this action*

23

This was whether the Council had control over itJ own agenda,
or whether the parties to a dispute could
the Council at will#

cases from

ArS^ing that the authority of the

Council was at stake, Velloso contended that the Council
oould decide Its own agenda, and he opposed the withdrawing
Of the question foi? that reason#
Thwarted in vbat seemed to be his aoment of victory,
Gromyko fouglit back vigorously*
again tliat both

He pointed out again and

Iran and the Soviet Union wanted the matter

dropped from the agenda, and the Council had no right to
oppose this view*

The United States and the United Kingdom

once had kept the question on the agenda because no agree
ment had been reached, and now that an agreement had been
reached, they still opposed the deletion of the question
from the agenda*

Here, Indeed, was the type of inconsistent

attitude which could undermine the prestige of the Council*
Gromyko also as se fted that the Dutch end Australian attitudes

23. Ibid.. pp. 132-133.
24. II'là.. P.à. 133-154,
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were IncoQpatltld with "the meantOG and letter of the
^25
Charter of our Organization*"
There now appeared the first major split In the antiSoviet hloo. Bonnet (France) wearied of two hours of
•somewhat complicated discussions," proposed that the case
be dropped and that the secretary-general report on any
further developments, in accordance with Article 99 of the
25

Charter,

The deletion of the question from the agenda would

be the simplest and least complicated method of solving
the discussion, and anyway the Council had fulfilled ita
committsionta to Iran#
Agreeing with the French representative only to the
extent of ending the discussion, Castillo Bajera (Jîexico)
brOw.ght up his favorite point. I.e.. that the small countries
were reassured that a favc^able Impression upon public
opinion the world over had been created by the Council*»
27
ectloh on the Iranian case. Therefore, he would vote for
the malnt&A//wrof the April 4 resolution,
Lange wanted to be put on record aa sharing the view
that the Council action of April 4 was legal, and this he
28
separated himself, on that Issue, from Gromyho, Even so,
t

25, Ibid,, p. 134,
26, Article 99 of the United Nations Charterr
Sec
retary-General may bring to the attention of the Security
Council any matter which in his opinion nay threateii the
maintenance of international peace and security,"
27, Security Council Official Records. First Year, First
Series, ^40«2,, pp, 13——137,
26, Ibid., p, 137,
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In view of the circumstances, Lan^e thought that the
I
question now should be dropped from the agenda. Since the
Council would not renounce completely Its Jurisdiction over
the question, the secretary-general could refer the matter
to the Council at any time.

Lange cited Article

whereby

parties can settle their disputes peacefully outside the
United nations, and argued that the Council }iad no cause
to interfere In the settlement and "create trouble between
29
the two parties." Lange upheld the doctrine that a country
had the right to withdraw its case from the Security Council
20
whenever it wished, and in this he followed the Soviet line*
But he would not admit that the Council action of April 4
was illegal, since he had voted for It. Cn this issue,
he was io a difficult position. Bad he condemned the action
as illegal, as had Gromyko, ho would have admitted supportli^g
an illegal act and further demonstrated Polandsubjection
to the Soviet Union.
After Lange had finished his outburst, Afifl Pasha,

31

29é Ibid.. pp. 138-139.

30. Ibid.. p. 139.
31. Hafez. Afifl Pasha, M.D. was a former member fif the
Itbsral constitutional party and political froat in Egypt.
Ho vfnB ambassador,to London and negotiated the treaty of
alliance with the United Kingdom in 1936. He was former
minister for foreign affairs and was representative to the
Security Council and the Atomic Energy eommlsslon in 1946*
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now repre#enting Zgypt In place of Haeean Pasha, endorsed
the view* Of the representatives of the United States,
the United Kingdom^ the Netherlands, Brazil, and Mexico#
^^^ Gromyko, Stettlnlua and Cadcgan now Involved themselves
in what almost amounted to a name-calling contest*

Crcmyko

tlfttiy asserted that Stettlnlus* proposal to keep the question
cm the agenda violated the Charter and Infringed upon the
sovereign rights of the United ITatlons members*

He store

that Intimated that the United States end the United Kingdom
did not with to settle the differences betueen the U#S.S*R*
and Iran, andhe accused both Stettlnlus and Cadogan of
32
using Iran as a "pawn" In the game of world politico*
Tired of listening to approximately three hours of
bickering, the president proposed adjournment*

But Stettlnlus,

angered by the Soviet tirade against hlmoclf and Cadogan,
wanted to reply to Gromyko*

In a rather disgusted and tired

manner, he contended that he had n^t made ony proposal
tN. this particular afternoon; he merely had attempted to

e:i^laln why the United States could not ouuport the reouest
33
put before the Cot^ncll by the U.S*E*R* representative*
w*

31# Security S :unc"l CTflclel Records, rirst ïear. First
Series, :Jo ,2,, p, 135.
32,

pp. 139-141.

33.

p. 141.

Gromyko was not let off eo easily by Cadogan, who
was fighting mad at the Implication that the United States
and the United Zlngdon were not genuinely Interested In
aettllng the Iranian matter# Gromyko was entirely wrong#
At all times both the United States and the United JClngdcxa

had worked to solve ••this thing!* The resolution of April 4
was such a solution* If the Soviet government had carried
out the assurances given to the Council by the Soviet delegate#
the Iranian question would not have come up agdln# After
all# It was Gromyko who had brought up the question again
In demanding that the Council rescind Its own resolution*
Ead Gromyko left veil enough alone# the Council would have
heard nothing more about the Iranian question* The president
abruptly'adjourned the meeting before fiiore replies or comments
could be made*
In this thirty-second meeting a most Important matter
aroset whether or not the Security Council was master of its
own agenda#

In the opinion of the Soviet bloc# the state

bringing the dispute to the Council at Its own discretion#
oould withdraw at will Its complaint# The antl-Govlet bloc
argued that the Council had every right to regulate the develop
ment of a dispute brought before It* If the Council had the
right to place a dispute on its agenda# It had an equal right
to say where It should be removed t r m the agenda* Here was
34# Ibid*# p# 141.
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a conetltutloneLl question of great importance*

Sven though

It can be assumed that had Stettlnlus and Cadogan wanted
to remove the Iranian question from the agenda, they would
have done so.

It was fortunate for the Security Council that

a majority of the members if even for practical reasons,
opposed the Soviet viewpoint and thus sustained the autonomy
of the new United Nations,
The thirty-second meeting also revealed a weakening
in the solidarity of the two blocs.

The French representative

momentarily supported the Soviet position, even though
Bonnet never accepted the Soviet reasoning behind that position
He wanted to dispose of the Iranian question in the most
convenient manner possible, though he wanted aacurances that
it could be brought back to the Council under Article 99#
if need be. Lange, too, departed though in a minor respect,
from a party line laid down by Gromyko*

He hardly could

argue that the April 4 resolution was Illegal, since he had
voted for it.

In spite of these two departures, the other

members of the two blocs stood firm, and thus the alignment
in the Security Council on the Iranian question was the
U.S.S.R, (with Polish backing) versus the U.S.A. and Great
Britain (with Egyptian, Dutch, Australian, Erazlallan, Chinese,
and Mexican backing).

- 115 -

^ Gromykoattempt to hmlllate the Counoll by forcing
It to rescind Its action of April 4 failed completely* Instead,
the anti-Soviet bloc determined the course of action and
Gromyko’s hopes came to naught#
s

•

—
f

The Iranian government’s

sudden reversal generally vas regarded by the anti-Soviet
nations merely aa an expression of Soviet pressure on Ghavam.
"Watch and va it" and no retreat became the anti-Soviet
♦
bloc’s attitude* ,The U*S«5*a# would have to keep ;
faith in withdrawing its troops from Iran*
The strong language, insults, and recrimination^ of
the Council members in this meeting were abruptly ended by
the president’s adjournment* But the extreme divergence
of views over whether the parties to a dispute oould withk i

draw the dispute from the Council was to continue on into
the next meeting and widen the cleavage between cast and
vest*
III
*' The thirty-third meeting of the Security Council met
on April l5f 1946 to continue the discussion of the Iranian
question* Bonnet, In the meanwhile, had drawn up a draft
35

resolution and had had it circulated among the members*
The French delegate’s draft resolution now read By the

president of the Council, re-stated what Bonnet had said
earlier* The secretary-general should collect information
to complete the Security Council’s report to the General
35. Ibid*, pp* 142-143*
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Agaembly on the Iranian ease, and the question then should
IK

*

be i^ropped froa the Council a&enda*
After reading Bonnet’s draft resolution^ the president
^
36
reported on a memorandum from Trygve Lie* the secretary'*
37
general of the united Z^atlone# Arguing that It was desirable
for him to present his official viewpoint* Lie summarized
the history of the Iranian case In so far as It applied to
the articles of Chapter 6 of the Charter# He concluded that;
*.*following withdrawal by the Iranian represent
ative* the question Is automatically removed from
the agenda* unless;
(a) The Security Council votes an Investigation
under Article 34* or
(b) A Member brings It up as a situation or dis
pute under Article 35* or
(c) ‘ The Council proceeds under Article 36* para
graph 1* which would appear to require apreliminary
finding that a dispute exists under Article 33*Q
or that there is *a situation of like nature
' Furthermore* Lie argued that since the Council had
neither Invoked Articles 34 and 35* paragraph 1 nor decided
that a dispute existed under Article 33* **lt may well be
there Is no way In which It can remain seized of the matter#

^39

n

36. Trygve n# Lie (1896) escaped to England with the
HorwêGfan government In 1940 and was acting forelg; minister
for Norway ( In England), 1940-45# fie evolved provision*!
measures that saved the HorwOejan n^eet for the Allies#. J/V
1945 he was chairman of the NorwôaXan delegation to the üàICIO
and chairman of the Horw^Gyan delegation to the J&eneral
Assembly* 1946# Also In 1946* he was elected secretarygeneral of the United (fatlcms#
7ïé Security Council Official Records^ First Year* First

Series* :Jo#2.f PP# 143-145#
38^ Ibli#* p# 144#
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The eeoretaty-^eneral used his legal right as adviser
to the Seourlty Counoll to present his vle%s#

In doing

so he added prestige to his office when^In a critical moment»
he chose to make his power f%t#

But In questioning the

legality of the Council** action In the thirty-second meeting»
he directly sustained the Bovlet position and weakened the
anti-Soviet bloc In the Council*
After Inquiring If It were agreeable to the rest of
the Council» the president referred the Lie memorandum to
the committee of experts for examination and report# The
committee*8 report should he made before Comcll action on
the memorandum#
the president#

Gromyko» naturally enr^mgh» supported
The others were silent# The president set

April 18 for the report of the committee#
The Council then got to work on the adjourned business
of the last meeting#

Stettlnlua answered Gromyko** charges
41
with accusations of his own# Membership on the Council
carried with It tremendous responsibilities» and Gromyko
had not lived up to these responsibilities*

On the other»

hand* both “Secretary of State Byrnes and I have scrupulously
refrained from questioning the motives of any Member» aik3
I shall therefore not pursue this aspect of the matter any
42
further**#" Stettlnlus reiterated: that the Council action
40; Ibid.. p# 145#
41# Ibid.. pp# 145-146#
42. Itia.. p. 145*
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Of April 4 was legal; that It was unwiee to drop the
(question frort the agenda; that the continued presence of
Soviet troope In Iran might have bad something to do with
the sudden reversal in Iranian oplnlm; and that the Iranian
question oould be disposed of under the resolution of llaS 6^
if on that date* Iran bad no more complaints#
Gromyko oounter-*attaoked# ,Ke had "called things by
*
their proper names* regardless of whether Mr. Stettlnlus
43
agreed with me or not*" he said* Since both Byrnes and
Stettlnlus earlier had opposed the removal of the Iranian
question because no agreement had been reached* their
"Inconsistency, and lack of logic" was demonstrated because*
now that agreement had been reached* they still opposed
dropping the question from the agenda#
Breaking into the Stcttlaius-Groayko quarrel* the
Retherlanda delegate said that the issue* in its simple^T
terms* was* "Who is master of the Council’s agenda#**It
Is not the parties* but the Council that admits a question
to the agenda; not the parties but the Council alone that
44
can remove It*" Speaking as therepresentative of China*
and not as president. Quo Tai-Chl supported the Netherlands
view* But when* In his presidential capacity* he asked
43, Ibid.. p. 147.
44. Ibid.. p. 147.
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for a vote on the «ovlet proposal, both. Lange and Bonnet
raised a point of order arguing that the Council could
not vote until It had received the report of the concaltteo
45
of experts# Reluctantly^ the president concurred and
postponed the vote#
A bitter altercation then broke out between the president
and Gromyko when Gromyko harshly condemned Quo Tal-Chl for
disregarding the seoretary-general’s mémorandum and his
own (Quo tal-Clhl*s) earlier ruling In sending the memorandum
46
to the CŒurnlttee of experts# The president lamely defended
himself by saying that he had forgotten about the memorandum,
but he did recall that In the thirty-second meeting Gromyko
*

had agreed to a vote# The meeting was then adjourned#
17
In attempting to remove Its complaint from the Council
agenda, Iran brought up a completely new problem for the
Council to solve: If theGecurlty
of its own agenda#

Councilwas tobe master

If the states party toa dispute could

withdraw their complaints at will, the prestige and power
of the Council would be greatly undermined# An Issue of
precedent of great importance wos thus raised* The members
45# Ibid.. pp# 149-150#
45# Ibid#, pp. 150-151#
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of the Council, la taking sides on this question, aJhered to
the saae general line aa before the presentation of the new
Iranian request# Those mambers (with the exception of France),
who previously had voted to retain the question on the agenda,
still wished to do so# The Council, therefore, was master
of Its own agenda*

On the other hand, those who had voted.

against the Inclusion of the Iranian complaint on the agenda,
still wanted It removed# The Council, therefore, was not
master of Its own agenda# And though the Issue remained
undecided at the end of the thirty-third meeting. It was
clear that the antl-Sovlet bloc, opposed by only the U.S.S.R.,
France, and Poland, would write its view Into the procedural
law of the Council#
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CHAPTER 6*
THE INDEFINITE PCSTFONmSNT
OF THE IRANIAN QUESTION
JL
The thlrty-Blxth meeting of the Security Council was
held m April 23» 1946; Afifl Pasha (Egypt), the new pres^
ident reminded the Gounoll of the postponement of discussion
/
on the Iranian question until the committee of eaçperta had
reached a decision and had submitted a report. The committee
had submitted a report, but It had not reached a unanimous
decision.

What was to be done now?

Gromyko started the discussion by trying to accommodate
the 8ecretary~general*8 memorandum to his own views. The
committee*8 failure to reach a unanimous decision, he said,
only relected the division in the Council, Because the
memorandum was. an impartial analysis of the legal aspects
of the question, the Council could not now prevent Iran
from withdrawing its complaint from the agenda. Had the
Council acted under the various articles of Chapter 6, Iran
could not remove Its complaint. But the Council had not
acted under the various articles of Chapter 6, (largely, it
must be remembered because of Gromyko's implied threat of using
the "veto" should the substantive aspect be- considered),
1, Security Counoll Officiai Records. First Year, First
Series, No, 2,, Hunter College, New York, (25^îarch 1946 to
26 June 1946), p, 102,
2, Ibid., pp, 201-203.
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Iranian dispute must be removed from the agenda.

The

contrary United States view was wrong, inconsistent and
illogical.
Denying Gromj'-ko's charges of inconsistency, Stettinius
said that he was unable to agree with the conclusions of
3
the secretary-general. If these conclusions were accepted,
they would seriously limit the Council’s power.

Since he

understood that Bonnet’s resolution (to remove the Iranian
question from the agenda) was procedural in character and
thus would reverse the resolution of April 4, Stettinius
was definitely opposed to it.
Hodgson at this moment tried to apply one of the
articles of Chapter 6 to the Iranian dispute.

Since the

situation was dangerous enough to warrant the Council’s
keeping the question on the agenda, he argued. Article 34
made the Security Council "the watchdog for the whole of the
United Nations."^

He had his doubts about the "agreement"

referred to in the Iranian statement, and he wanted the
question to be kept on the agenda,^
To defend his resolution in the face of Stettinius’
attack. Bonnet reiterated his idea that the Coundil already
had done its duty toward Iran.

3. Ibid.. pp. 203-206.
4# Ibid., pp. 204—206.
5. Ibid., p. 204.

His resolution in no way
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limited the Counoll s powers over the Iranlas question*

6

It merely reoognlzed the conciliatory aspects of an agreement
reached by bilateral negotiations* The United étions, stood
for peace# and whether that peace were secured by Council
action or negotiationswas Irrelevant.
F#

Cadogan asserted that the Charter neither explicitly
permitted a party to withdraw its complaint not explicitly
permitted the Council to control its own agenda. In direct
opposition to Gromyko*6 conclusion that the lack of unanimity
la the committee report was "regrettable#* Cadogan thought
that it was well that# on so abstract an Issue# the technlcal conmittee had not laid down a general rulè to govern

7

the Council in all eases,

Ccomon sense was necessary in

interpreting the Charter, Two more divergent viewpoints
(that those of Gromyko and Cadogan) could hardly be found#
r

and once again revealed the disparity between the AngloSaxon and Russian Interpretations of a written document,
While the Polish representative once again came out
8
9
in support of the French resolution, Rafael de la Collna;
Ibid

PP. 205—207*

7, Ibid.. PP, 207-208,
1
8, Ibid.. pp. 208-210,
9, Rafael de la Collna (1898) became a council to various
cities in the United States end was minister councilor to the
embassy in Washington U.C.# and was minister in Washington B.G,
in 1944. He was a representative to the oouAcil of organiz
ation of American states, Washington# 1948# deputy secretary
general on the Inter-Amerlcaa conference of problems of war
and peace# and representative to the ÜZîCIC, 1945 and to the
General Assembly and Security Council# 1946,

^

l2S

•

(now representing Mexico), Quo Tal-Chl» and Yolloso supported
10
the United States and British views* Groznyko dropped his
11
proposal to oome to the support of the French resolution#
i
’■
A vote was taken on the French resolution by a show of hands»
and It was rejected by 8 to 3*

France, Poland, and the
12

«

,U#S*S#H. voted In favor of the resolution#
The second Soviet walkout now resulted from Groayko*a
contention that, since the U*5*S.a. and Iran had reached
an agreement and that Iron^ >. had withdrawn Its appeal to
the Security Council, the defeat of the French resolution
violated the United Batlona Charter# The U.S.S.R# delegate
could take no part In future discussions of the Iranian queetloi
13
by the Council# The meeting was then adjourned#
The highlight of the thirty-sixth meeting was the second
^ovlet walkout, but unlike his first walkout, Gromyko
did not actually get up and leave the Council chamber* The
meeting was so near adjournment that there was no need for
this#
In spite of Iranis request to withdraw its appeal,
Gromyko’s endless remonstrances, sarcasms, and outbursts,
10. -Security Council Official Records^ First Year, First
Series, ^0*2#, pp# 210-213#
^Td., p* 213#
12# Ibli#, p# 213.
13. lÈlâ.# PP. 213-214#
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Bonnet's split with the other anti-Soviet powers over his
resolution to delete the question fron the agendat the antiSoviet forces retained their control of procedural matters
la the Counoll, (^ny substantive matter, of course^ was
subject to Gromyko' s**veto^)# And vlth the defeat of the
French resolution, the Security Council remained the master
of its own agenda*
II
,The next meeting of the Security Counoll to discuss
the Iranian question (the fortieth} was held at Hunter
College on Kay 8, 1946* Gromyko vas absent* The delay
resulted froa the Council's, taking no action until It had
%

received a letter from the Iranian representative on May 6
14
as provided for In the April 4 resolution* Ala's letter
categorically stated that Soviet troops already had been
evacuated fr<xs the provinces of Khurasan, Gorgan, Kazanderan,
15
and Gllan* But this picture of ^ovlet co-operation was
shattered when the Iranian letter àtated that, in so far as
the rest of Azerbaijan was ccwicomed, the Iranian government
could make no investigation because of Soviet Interference*
The Iranian government, it was true, had been informed by
other sources that the evacuation of Soviet troops from
14* Ibid*, pp. 246-247*
15* Ibid.. p* 246*
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Azerbaijan vas underway, but these reports had not been
verified by any Iranian official#
Stettinius* Busplolons of Soviet Intentions apparently
had been justified, as had his leadership in keeping the
question on the agenda# Because Gromyko hod ignored the
Counoll*8 request to submit, a report by May ô and because
the Iranian government still complained of Soviet interference
Stettinius ehbmitted a prepared draft resolution#

(Me had

written it In advance after having read the Iranian letter}#
It read*
The Security Council.
HavinF. considered the statement made by the
Iranian Government in its preliminary report of
6 May# aubftitted in compliance with the resolution
of 4 April 1946, that It was not able as of 6
Kay to state whether the withdrawal of all USSR
troops from the whole of Iran had been completed,

J^gsjayjSâ
To defer further proceedings on the Iranian
matter in order that the Government of Iran may
have time in which to ascertain through its
official representatives whether all USSR troops
have been withdrawn from the whole of Iran;
To request the Iranian Government to submit
a complete report on the subject to the Security
Council immediately upon the receipt of the.inform
mation which will enable it so to do; andjln case
it is unable to obtain ouch information by 20
Hay, to report on that day such information as
is available to it at that time; and
To consider immediately following the receipt
from the Iranian Government of the report requested
what further proceedings may be required#^^
16, lÈiâ,, pp, £47-248,
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17

Paul üasltiok (aov representing Australia) had no
objection to the Stettinius resolution **as far as It goes."
Complaining that It Ignored Gromykofailure to send In a
report (as required by the resolution of April 4), Kasluck
was deeply worried by the second absence of the Soviet
18
delegate* Where did Gromyko stand* and did he claim "veto"
rights?
Cadogan unmoved, by Gr(^yko*s absence^ undertook to
quiet Haeluck*a fears* As long as a quorum was maintained
19
In the Counoll* Its work was unimpaired* Since the resolution
before the Counoll was a procedural one, van Kleffens maintained
the Council had every legitimate right to vote on Stettinius*
20
resolution in Gromyko s absence*
A vote was taken on the Stettinius resolution* and It
21

was adopted without objection* The president then adjourned
the meeting*
Althoughtthe fortieth meeting was the shortest held
so far on the Iranian dispute* the Stettinius resolution
17. Paul nasluck (1905-*
) was director of the poqt-war
section of the department of external affdlrs, 1941-44* Ke
was director of the post-hùstilltles division after &orld
War II, and in 1946 he was representative to the Security
Council and the Atomic Energy Council*
18* Security Council Official Records. First Year* First
Series* Ho*2** pp* 240-250*
19# aid## p. 251*
20* Iklâ/i PP# 251-252*
*
•
21. Ibia.. 9. 252.
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was passed and an Important legal problem was consideredi
what was the Counoll to do about the absence of the Soviet
member# Hasluck complained that the Council now had to
**obtain from the absent member a clear idea of what he
22

claims is the effect of his absence** and although it
seemed to him that *the first step towards resolving this
: 23
question" was an effort along this line^ the question was
left undecided by the Council.
Three views Oame out of this absence of the Ü.S.S.R.
representative. They are#
(1) In the practice of the Security Council
absence of a member» even of a permanent member#
does not prevent this body from adopting a res^
olution. Absence of a permanent member is con
sidered to be equivalent to abstention from voting#
(2) While the question has thus arisen but one*
it .would appear, on the basis of the Council*s
action in the Iranian case, that an absence is
regarded as having the same legal effect, so far
as voting is concerned, as an abstention. It
would thus appear that the absence of permanent
member doea not prevent the Security Council
from taking a decision on substantive questions*
(5) In view of the case that on matters of sub-*
stance the concurring votes of the permanent
members is required, the Soviet Delegate by thus
absenting himself caused à blanket veto over all
substantive decisions which the Security Council
have decided to take.24
22* Ibid.. p. 250
23, Ibid., p. 250.
24* Leo* Gross, Voting in the Security Council; Abstention
from Voting and Abstention from Meetings. The Xale Law
Journal, February, 1951# ÿew Haven, Conn., .The Yale Law
Jou m a l Inc,,
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The antl-Sovlet siembers accepted the first two views, while
Groayko adhering to a stricter Interpretation of the
Charter, accepted only the third view*
III
The'forty-third and last meùtlng on the Iranian question
was held on May 22, 1946* Again the Soviet representative
25^
was ateenti;* A« Farodl (France) was the new piresldent*
In the previous two day#, the Iranian delegate had sub
mitted two conflicting reports to the Counoll.

On May 20,

Ala had written that he had received no very precise Infor#
matlon about the situation in his country and that the con
ditions laid down by the Security Council had not been ful26
filled. On toy 21, however, he wrote that Soviet troops
27
had evacuated Azerbaijan by Kay 6, And Ghavaa, the Iranian
prime minister, had telegraphed to the president of the Council
that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from Azerbaijan by
28
May 6,
In view of the confused situation the presiDf/J^ regrette<
25. Alexandre Parodl (1901} became director-general
of the French committee of national liberation and of the
financial and social council of resistance in 1944# He
was minister of labor, 1944-46 end president of the Intematlom
labor conference, 1945, ambassador to Rome and delegate to
the allied advisory council for Italy, 1945. He became a
{permanent member to the United Nations, 1946,
26* Security Council Official Records. First Tear, First
Scries, ÿo^yi^ment No#2,, pp, 52-53.
27, IbM,f PP# 53-54.
26, Security Council Offlclal Records. First Tear, First
Series, No,2., p. 287,
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The antl~Sovlet aembere accepted the first two views, while
Gromyko adhering to a stricter interpretation of the
Charter, accepted only the third view*
III
The forty-third and last meeting on the Iranian question
was held on May 22, 1946* Again the Soviet representative
25^
was abfionti.. A* Parodl (France) was the now pxresldent*
In the previous two dayp, the Iranian delegate had sub
mitted two conflicting reports to the Council*

On hay 20,

Ala had written that he had received no very precise Infoxv
matlon about the situation In his country and that the con
ditions laid down by the Security Council had not been ful26
filled* On îîay 21, however, he wrote that Soviet troops
27
had evacuated Azerbaijan by Kay 6* And Ghavam, the Iranian
prime minister, had telegraphed to the president of the Council
that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from Azerbaijan by
28
May 6* In view of the confused situation the presto^ regrette<
25. Alexandre Parodl (1901) became director-general
of the French committee of national liberation and of the
financial and social council of resistance In 1944* He
was minister of labor, 1944-46 and president of the Internationa
labor conference, 1945* ambassador to Rome and delegate to
the allied advisory council for Italy, 1945* He became a
î^ermanent member to the United Hatlons, 1946*
26* Security Council Official Records, First Tear, First
Series, Sopfigment Ho*2*, pp, 52-53.
27* Ibii^f PP* 53-54.
28* Security Council Official Records* First Year, First
Series, Ho*2#, p* 287*
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fretted the Iranian complilnt In Ala^fi letter of I-Iay 20,
' 29
After welooiaing Luis Padilla Nervo, the new Mexican
representative, Stettinius suggested that no aoti(w be
taken on the Iranian question until theaituation of conflicting
reports bad been cleared up* But the question was not to
be dropped from the agenda,

Cadogan agreed with Stettinius

butL he described Ohavaa’a telegram as only an

interim

report*^ He wanted an answer to "certain questions to
31
elucidate further the attitude of the Government in Tehran,#’*
First, did the territory referred to in the Iranian telegram
include all the places formerly occupied by Soviet troops.
Second, was the government in Tehran satisifed with the evaOr*
nation of the Soviet troops*

Third,t what steps had the Iranian

Investigating commission teiken to verify the report that
equipment and means of transport had been removed,. Fourth,
had any investigatim been made of the reports to the Iranian
government by the loyal Iranians in those provinces just
evacuated. As it turned out, no one answered these questions
directly, but Ala answered similar questions later put to
him by Lange,
Lange expressed regret over the way in which the Council
29# Luis fad ilia Nervo (1898-^
) entered the diplomatic
service in 1930 and was a representative to the League of
Nations in 1937# In 1946, he was chairman of the delegation
to the last assembly of the League In Geneva and a represent
ative to the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the
Atomic Energy Commission#
30# Security Council Official Records. First Year, First
Series, Ko, 2,, pp. 287^208# '
31# Ibid.# p, 289.
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32

had handled the Iranian mattdr#

It was unfortunate that

Bonnet*3 proposal had been defeated, and It %raa contrary
to the "letter and spiirlt" of the Charter to retain the questio
on the amenda# Lange had looked up the places mentl<«ed
tn the Iranian report, he said, and the places mentioned
covered the whole of Aze^gmijan# The only course open to
the Council was the imnedate deletion of the Iranian question
froa the agenda#
To straighten out the confusion caused by the conflicting
Iranian reports, van Kleffens proposed to seat Ala at the
33
Council table# The proposal vas adopted without discussions,
and at the Invitation of the president, Ala was seated#
Van Kleffens asked Ala if the complaint relative to Soviet
interference were before the Council again.
To Ala*8 knowledge, Iren*» first complaint was still
' 34
on the agenda# He explained that the Iranian withdrawal of
its dispute from the agenda concerned the second part only,
i.e., the evacuation of ^oviet troops.

The withdrawal had

not included Iran*© complaint about Soviet interference in
Iran*» domestic affairs# However, Soviet assurances had
prompted Ghavam to withdraw the entire dispute on April 15#
32; Ibid.# p, 290.
33. -Ibid., pjl 291-292#
34#

Ibid.. p#

293#

-

As for Ghavan*a tslerram, Ala thought It was Inconclusive
In thet It did not clearly state that Soviet troops had
been withdrawn from all of Azerbaijan* To clear up the con-»
fusion resulting from his oonfllotlng reports, he reminded
the Council that the I-Igy 20 report had been due on that day
at the latest* However, on Hay 21, he had received this
new information and had Inmedâtely sent It to the Council*,
Lan^e now resumed his Ibns-lnterrupted t^teVtèt^ with
35
Ala* Lance wanted four questions answered. First, had the
Iranian Government lost faith In the assurances of the U.S«S#R.
!îcxt he wanted to know If the Government of Iran agreed with
Byrnes* statement In which he said, "After all, the withdrawal
of troops without condition la the only sane method of dis
posing of any question of Interference In the government of
.36
Iran." Third, did the Iranian government have other complaints
la addition to the wlthdmwal of troops.

Fourth, did Iran

Consider the U.S.S.R. as the only country Interfering In
the Internal affairs of Iran.
Answering the Polish delegate question for question,
Ala vent into a lengthy discussion of the first question.
35. Àtia.. pp. 294-295.
36. -Itia.. p. 294.
37. Itia.. p. 295.

37
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The Iranian covem.Ticnt had not lost confidence In the
U.S.3.R., "we ere continuing to hope," said Ala#

Every

sane Iranian wanted friendly relations with Iron’s great
northern neighbor# Again accusing Soviet authorities of
encouraging the autonomy movement In Azerbaijan, Aia still
was not sure that the Iranian case should be dropped from
the agenda# As for the Eymea statement, Ala reminded
Lange that the Council had aocepted It earlier• It had been*
and still was hoped that the withdrawal of •Soviet troops
would terminate Soviet Interference la the Internal affairs
of Iran
As for implication that other nations were Interfering
In Iran, Ala clearly and defiantly contended that the
alone was intervening# Hot only had the United States and
the Pnlted Kingdom withdrawn their troops, but, as far as
Ala knew* those two countries had never Interfered In Iranian
internal affairs*

(fie obviously me#r since World War II*

since the British for centuries, had Interfered la one fora or
another* In Iran and Ala made no mention of the AngloIranian Oil Company)# As for Lange’s map reading, Ala said
the names mentioned In Ghavam’s telegram sounded as though
they were In the western part of Azerbaijan, and Soviet troops
might very well still be stationed In some of the smaller
38
vUlagoa*
38# Ibid.. p. 297.
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Lange thanked Ala for his answers but asked him to
bear with him for a few alnutes longer, "so that I may
request elucidation on three more points which are connected
with his answers**

First, If the central govemment had

been unable to send a, commission to Azerbaijan and, at
the same time, bad Informed the Counoll that various places
in Azerbaijan had been carefully Investigated, Lange
wanted to know whether these *Investigations" had been con
ducted *from an aeroplane by telescope?" Second, who was
rightt the prime minister who declared that Soviet troops
had been evacuated by Zlay 6 or Ala who asserted that he was
not quite sure that they had been evacuated.

Third*

Does the withdrawal of the complaint made In
the letter from the representative of Iran On
15 April hold or shàll we Interpret his action
now as presenting us with a new conplalnt?^^
While he did not want to Interrupt the exchange of
Views going on between the Polish and Iranian delegates,
Stettinius nevertheless wanted to make It clear that It
would be a mistake to drop the Iranian case this particular
morning. He suggested that the Iranian dispute be deferred
r
41
until a later meeting to be celled by the president,
39* Ibid,, pp* 297-298,
AO, Ibid.. p. 298.

Ax,

p, 298,

•
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EaaluclclAstral la) also called Lange's attention to the
fact thai.^the Iranian questI m vas atH I on the agenda^ and^
while.%»,1^ Is Interesting to know whether or not the Iranian
41

.1

'

Ooremroent withdraws any statement In regard to this matter

^

I

4a

before the Council#.*"

'

the Council alone would decide

t

whether the .complaint would remain on the agenda.

Sc^a-

vhat offended, Lange replied that he wanted It understood
"emphatically that the Qovemment of Poland accepts all
43
declslona arrived at by this Council#"
*
Ala got his chandO to answer the last three questions
after Lange had answered Hasluok's charges. As for the
"aeroplane>and telescope" the investigating commission had
:
»
travelled In an airplane, a Soviet one. but as for using a
44

"telescope or even a microscope," Ala knew nothing.

The

Council alone had Jurisdiction over whether the question would
be dropped frcsa the agenda, and^It was true that the Iranian
government had asked for the removal of the second part of the
complaint, namely troop evacuation*

It had done so under

the Impression that the Soviet government would honor Its
assurances. (Ala forgot that the Iranian statement of
April 15 "ending" the dispute had not separated the complaint
42.* Ibid.. p. 299#
43# m i d .; p. 299#

44; Ibid;; p. 299#
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Into two parts)# liorecrrer, tor Lan^e to understand the
tele^raa ooapletely, he had to read all of It. Sot knowing
at the moment Just where his government stood, Ala assumed
45
that the question should be kept on the agenda.
After fad 111o Servo suggested that the discussion be
postponed to give the Council more tine to examine the
oase, fsrodl (France) urged a coiipronlse solution*

Pojrodl

asked the Councils
•••to leave the question on the agenda for a
short time on the understanding that If within
a certain period (say eight or ten days) no
Informatlm has been received which wexild conflict
with that already in our possession, the question
will automatically be dropped from the agenda,47
Although the Fx*enoh position was not too far removed
from that of the antl-Sovlet bloc, Cadogan was "very sorry**
that he could not accept It#.

Before the question was dropped

from the agenda, he wanted the Iranian government to be
40
completely satislfled# Stettinius as usual agreed with
49
Cedogsn’s remarks.
When the president asked Padlllo Kervo If he had pro-*
posed any specific period of postponement, the latter replied
45# Ib.^d., p# 500,
46, Ibid.. ppp. 500-301#
47* ibM., p. 502,
48, X^i4#, p, 505#
49, Ibid.# p. 305#
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50

that one or two daye would euffloe# Both HaaXuclc and
Lans® dleasreed with such a postponemeatp and Lanse In turn
aug£08ted that the Council send a telecraa to the Iranian
prime minister, aXJclns If he were fully satislfled with the
51

withdrawal of soviet troops#
Taking exception to the proposed telegram, van Kleffens
made his own motion;
llay I move that adjourn the discussion of
the Iranian question until a date in the
near future, the Council to be called to
gether at the request of any menber#52
Badillo Hervo then withdrew his proposal to support von
Kleffens# The" president called for a vote on the Aether53
Xàndfl propoaal,"and it ^as adopted by 9 votes to 1 vote#
Lange cast the negative vote# A vote on the Bolieh pro
posal to ceni a telegram to the Iranian prime minister was
54

rejected by 8 votes to 2# The meeting was then adjourned#
r/
The forty-third meeting proved to to the last meeting
in which the Security Council discussed the Iranian question#
Although the Netherlands resolution provided for a meeting
on the question at some later date it was never called*

50, J È M » P, 203*
51, i m

• p, 304,

52, iUfi , P. 304,
, P, 305.
53,
54. m i

• P. 305.
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Again the CDuacH postponed action‘end left the dis
putants to work out a compromise solution by themselves#
Van Zleffens'r resolution followed the same line as
the other fcarlier antl-Sovlet proposals and resolutions.
I.e.. postpone action on thé Iranian question while the
U»S.S.R# and Iran negotiated* The French proposal auto
matically to drop the question after a specified period,
however. Hid not suit the leaders of the antl-Sovlet bloc,
namely the United States and the United Kingdom#
Lange tried his &est to carry out Gromyko^ a policy,
and he was consistently pro-^ovlet In hi© arguments# Gromyko*ô
r

absence In Itself led to some legal soul-searching by Hasluck,
especially since Gromyko had Ignored the Council resolution
of April 4 to make a report to the Council# But the Issue
of •‘absence and veto" vas never specifically settled* That
the Council continued to discuss the Iranian question,
however. Implied that It was procedural la nature and that
the Soviet absence did not constitute a"veto."
Borne confusion vas caused by Ala’s conflicting reports#
However, he removed the confusion by pointing out that he
had obeyed the Como 11 resolution of April 4 to communicate
with the Council as soon as semething new had appeared# Ala,
Indeed, reflected the eagerness of the Iranian government
to remain on good terns with both the U*3#G.R# and the Council#
When Gromyko sneered at the personal integrity of the Iranian
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delegate, Ala replied with no personal remarks about
Soviet integrity, except to aay that he believed In it.
At the Same time, he followed the Council*» requirmnents
to the letter*
After Gromyko*s walkout (he was present when other
matters were .eonsldered) the discussions were much more
amiable.

And the anti-Soviet:.bloo again demonstrated its

power over Council procedure when it adopted the van Kleffens
resolution and rejected Lange’s proposal,
The Council, by postponeing the question **untll a date
in the near future,** postponed it for good, and the question
was to remain on the agenda indefinitely*
Bummer of

As late as the

1951» oo move had been made to remove it from

the agenda.

— Î4l —

CHAPTEa 7.

'CONCLUSION
I
through the centuales* Iran ham had to play the part
of a small power whose sovereignty and independence wdre
limited by interested great powers, especially Russia
(or the Soviet Union) and Great Britain* For various
reasons (see Chapter 1), these powers had played power
politics In Iran without any regard for Iran’s welfare or
benefit., In deferise, Iran developed the policy of trying
to play one great power off against the other and in this
way maintained:its independence*
This policy oame to naught when in 1907 Russia and Great
Britain reached an agreement to divide Iran (then Persia)
into three splieres of'influence* However, the defeat of
s'

Imperial Russia in World War I and the rise of the Bolshevik!
to power upset the balance ,of power in the Near East, and
Great Britain tried to make Iran a dependency In fact if not
in name.

But in 1921, Soviet Russia and Iran concluded a

friendship agreement permitting the Soviet Union to inter
vene In Iran in the event of Intervention by a third party*
In 1925» the old dynasty was overthrown by Rlza Shah,
an army officer who oame to be called the Mustafa Nemal of
Iran* Hie attempts to modernize the country and make it
independent and progressive nation did not succeed, but
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they did.Involve Iran In a dispute with the Anglo-lranian
/

Oil Obmpanj^ the Biriliah ooncession acquired in 1914.
this dispute, and one earlier with the Soviets in 1919-20,
brought]Iran as a suppliant to the Oouno il of the League
of Bâtions.

It is instructive to note briefly the similar-*

Ity of^ |tb.e Iranian oase in the United Bâtions with the IranU'
ian oases in the League of Hâtions.
Thji first case that came before the League in 1920
w#a an jlz^ian complaint against Soviet Russia. White
Russieoi forces under General Denikin were using Persia as
a base ofioperations against Soviet Russia, which retaliated
' &
by bombing the Persian port of Enzeli on the Caspian Sea
)^T
where Wjhi|e Russian troops were stationed. .Upcm the receipt
of several letters from the Persian foreign minister, the
Leagu^ Council, on June 16, 1920, took up the matter. But,
/i
lil^ the Security Council on January 30, 1946, it adopted
a y^eolution to the effect that, ^before taking acting,
ii would be well to await the results of direct negotiations
1
between parties." The negotiations resulted in the 1921
treaty.
A second dispute Involving Persia was brought before

the League of Hâtions by the British government on December
14, 1932. At this time, the Persian government had cancelled
1. United Nations News. Vol. I., No. 5*, May 1946, New
York, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, p. 3*

”

1*3 T

the concession held hy the Anglo-Perslan Oil Company,
The British government took up the:Oil company’s case and
protested the cancellation of the concession*

In this case,

too, the League Council deferred consideration of the questlcm
until negotiations were finally concluded by a new agreement,
an agreemaat ^^considerably more favorable to Persia than
2
the original concession,*
In the Security Council aalln the League Council, the
Iranian question was postponed again and again, and the
disputes were left to settlement by direct negotiations*
Even as It must be remembered that Iran’s negotiating
position was greatly strengthened by having Its disputes
on the agendas of the Councils,

These International or
/
world organizations. In spite of their obnloua weaknesses,
have proved their worth, at least to Iran*
When the Iranian government became Involved.In World
War II, there followed the abdication of Elza Shah and the
occupation of the country by British, Soviet and later
Americam troops. After using Iran to protect an Important
supply route to the C*S.S*H., the British and American troops
left the country at the end of the war*

But the Soviet Union

not only fostered an &uton<my movement In Azerbaijan but
all during thewar and afterwards. Interfered In the Internal
affairs of Iran*
2* %b^d*, p* A*

Confronted with what seemed to be an almost
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impossible situation after the failure of negotiating
with the

and the Moscow conference, and remembering

its successes with League backing, the Iranian government
referred the dispute to the new United HatIons Security
Council*
II
In taking up the Iranian question in its second meeting,
the Security Council was courageous in meeting head on a
dispute that threatened to disturb world peace*

In the

actual working of the Security Council, every member felt
that far more was at stake than the solution of one problem*
Since the Iranian complaint was the first important oase
to come before it, the Security Council probed for techinques
and prinioplea that might be cited as precedents in future
eases* Each member was clearly conscious that each separate
step in the proceedings was of long-run significance.
The members of the Council tried to support their
arguments by citing as evidence the relevant articles of
the Charter and especially those articles in Chapter 6* To
sustain their arguments, all members tried to Interpret a
procedure that soon involved the Security Council la a problem
that has not yet been solved. I.e.,whether the Council should
adhere to a "broad" or a "strict* interpretation of the Charter,
The Soviet representatives, in particular, insisted on a
strict or literal interpretation*

On the other hand, the
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or th0 Council led bj the United States and
Great Britain* wanted the procedure of the Council kept
flexible and fluid under a broad interpretatlcn of the
Charter*
The Council also encountered the difficulty for the
first time* of the absence of a permanent member*

Since

It had to be decided whether the action taken by the Council
were procedural or substantive* the Soviet walkout raised
the question of whether the Council could take action on
the Iranian oase*

Ikider Article 27* paragraph 2* the Council

could take action on any procédural Question with the affir
mative vote of 7 of Its members. However, under paragraph
3 of the same article, the Council had to have the poncurrlnR
votes of the five permanent members on any question other
than procedural* f.>e.. a ^
jgubatantlve question* This Is the
"veto."
It was seamlngty decided In the Iranian case that the
action taken In the absence of the Soviet representative
was of rrocedurai nature and therefore not subject to a
SovlCf'hianket veto*** It la pertinent to observe that ae
little mention as possible was made ofthe absence of the
Soviet representative despite the fears of many observers
that the new organization would break up over this question*
The Council did not reprimand the Soviet representative In
any way* offlclaly or biherwlse*

It was content to deal
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with the queetlcm at hand# namely Ita eompetenoe to adopt
procedural resolutions during the absence of the Soviet
delegate.
Even though the Council never acted on, or even considered
the substance of the Iranian questlm# Iran benefited greatly
from being able to play off the antl-Sovlet bloc against
the Soviet bloc and to publicize Its complaint In a world
forum. . Iran# in fact, used the United Nations against
the Soviet Union to protect Its threatened independence
and sovereignty# and the agreement reached with the U.S.S.R*
(outside the Council) waa shaped by the Council’s threat
to reconsider the question should that agreement be unsatis
factory to Iran'* Without the Security Council’s help
an agreement would have been reached between the two disputante that would have been entirely favorable to the U.3.8.R*
Perhaps Iren would have lost ita Sovereignty altogether* But
Iran was able not only to re-establish Its sovereignty over
Azerbaijan In December, 1946 but also to readh a favorable
settlement over oil concessions with the Soviet Union only
because It had a place to take Its grievances where It could
hopà for a fair hearing*

While the Council seemed at times

to be a debating society only# It performed In reality the
duty of a International tribunal where a small power could
present Its case against a great power#
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After the Netherlands proposal to **adJoum the dis
cussion of the Iranian question until a date In the near
future, the Council to be called together at the request
of any member,

only one more reference was made to the

question 1th 1946.

This was a letter from the Iranian

ambassador to the United States to the secretary-general of
4
the United Nations* The letter was a report concerning
the state of affairs In the province of Azerbaijan*

It in

part stated that the central government had not yet bean
able to re-establish its authority In Azerbaijan and that
the Soviet ambassador had advised the central government
not to try to send troops to this province. To preserve
order 1$ the general election of December 7» however, Iran
would take the action necessary to maintain law and order
throughout Iran*

The Iranian government was glad of the

decision of the Security Council to remain •‘seized'* of the
question.
By the end on December, 1946, the Iranian government
was able to suppress the autonomy movement In Azerbaijan
and the general election (supposed to take place In Dec
ember) was held In January,

The Iranian dispute was ended.

3* Security Council Official Records. First Year, First
Series, No, 2., p, 304.
4. United Nations Yearbook. 1946-1947. Department of Pub
lic Information, Lake Success, New York, pp. 335-336.
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from other Soviet periodicals* a very &ood bvssssbxj
of the Iranian dispute was £ivcn in .■Xntematl.on..al
Organization6m The summary covered the pro£resa of
the Iranian question in Its entirety, through the
Security Cmmcil, An article by Supreme Court Justice
pouglsB, and several other articles concerning Iran
were found in LifCm Along with the pictures of the
country and the people, the articles were Interesting
and Informative* ^leweweelc covered In detail Groayko a
walkout and gave a picture of Byrnes* twisting around
in hia seat to watch Gromyko leave* .Time carried &
story about the Soviet walkout also but lacked the
picture# The background for Iron in the League of
Nations was derived froa the tbited ^ntlona News.
A good sujGEsary of the effect of tîio absence of the
Soviet dôlegateffrœa the Security Council was given

In 2m lals.6&K

C, SEViS?SK35S

The ??ew. rorft Tines. Swrembsr, IS44.
The New Yoyk Times was a good source for back»
ground E^itertsl cm the Iranien question#
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TEXT OF yHS ANGLO-ROSSIAH
BAPPROCHEHEOT REGARDim PERSIA

Î2SZ
The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having
mutually engaged to respect the integrity and Independence
of Persia* and sincerely desiring the preservation of order
throughout that country and its peaceful development, as
well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for
the trade and industry of allother nations;
Considering that each of them has, for geographical and
economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of
peace and order In certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or
in the neighborhood of, the Russian frcmtler on the one hand,
and the frontiers of Afghanistan end Baluchistan on the other
hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict
between their respective interests in the abovementioned
provinces of Persia)
Have agreed on the following terms*—
I# Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and
not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour
of the subjects of third Powers, and Concessions of a political
or commerlcal nature— such as Concessions for railways, bahks,
telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, ets.— beyond a line
starting from Kasr-i-Bhlrin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd,
Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the
intersection of the Susalan and Afghan frontires, and not to
oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions
In this region which are supported by the Russian Government#
It is understood that the above-mentioned places are Included
In the region In which Great Britain engages not to seek the
Concessions referred to.
II.
Russia, or her part, engages not to seek for herself
and not to support, in favour of Russian subjects, or in
favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a
political or commercial nature— such as Concessions for rail
ways, banka* telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—
beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gaaik,
Birjand, Kerman, andeending at Bunder Abbas, and not to
oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Con
cessions in this region which are supported by the British
Goverament. It is understood that the above-mentioned
places are Included in the region, inwwhich Russia engages
not to seek the Concessions referred to.
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III.
Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without
previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any
Concession whatever to British subjects in the regions of
Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I
and II.
Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards
the grant of Concession to Russian subjects in the same regions
of Persia*
All Concession existing at present in the regions indioate<
in Articles I and II are maintained.
17. It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian
customs, with the exception of those of Parsistan and of the
Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amoritization and the
interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah
with the "Banque d* Escompte et des Prêta de Perse* up to the
date of the signature of the present Agreement, shall be
devoted to the same purpose as in the past.
It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian
customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those
of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and
those of the Posts and Islegraphs/ shall be devoted, as in
the past, to the service of the loans concluded by the Gov
ernment of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to
the date of the signature of the present Agreement.
7. In the event of irregularities occurring in the amort
ization or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans
concluded with the "Banque d^ Escompte et des Prêts de Perse*
and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the .
signature of the present Agteement, and in the event of the
necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the
sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the
loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in
the region mentlonediin Article II of the present Agreement,
of for Great Britain to establish ccntrol over the sources
of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans con
cluded With the second-named bank, and situated in the region
mentioned in Article I of the present Agreement, the British
and Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand into
a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in
agreement with each other, the measures of cwbrol in question
and to avoid all Interference which would not be in conformity
with the principles governing the present Agreement,
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TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND THE RUSSIAN
REPUBLIC. MOSCOW. FEBRUARY 26. 1921
(Ratlflcatlona exchanged at Teheran^ February 26, 1922)
{Translation,)
The Persian Government, or the one part, and the Russian
Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, of the other part, desiring
to establish relations of friendship and fraternity between
the two nations;; have decided to engage In negotiations for
this purpose, sjnd have therefore appointed the following
Plenipotentiaries*
For Persia:? Ala Gholi Ehan Mochaverol-Mamalek, and
For RusslaV O.V, Chloherla and L,M.Ksrakhan,
Who, after the verification of their respective
powers, have ag^ed as follows ;
Art* I*/In/hrder to confirm Its declarations regarding
Russian policy /towards the Persian nation, which formed the
subject of correspondence on the lAth January', 1918, and the
26th June, 1019,[the R.S.F.3.R*. formally affirms once again
that It definitely renounces the tyrannical policy carried
out by the blionising Governments of Russian which have
been overthrown .
by the will of the woï?pr/tf and peasants of
Russia. /
Ii;rspired bÿ this principle, and desiring that the
Persian people should be happy and Independent and should
be able/to dis^yse freely of Its patrimony, the Russian
Republic declass the whole body of treaties and conventions
concluded wit^: Persia by the Tsarist Government, which crushed
the rights/of the Persian people, to be null and void.
If.

R*SâF,S#R*. expresses Its reprobation of the

policy'of; thf''Tsàr1st Governments of Russia, which, ,on the
pretext o f surIng the Independence of the peoples of Asia,
concluded. Without the consent of the latter, treaties with
Europeair Ppwer^, the sole object of which was to subjugate

those peofiies» ,
Thie criminal policy, which Infringed upon the Indepen
dence
the; countries of Asia and which made the living
natiohâ 'of "the East a prey to the cupidity and the tyranny
of ^ro^an {robbers. In abandoned unconditionally by Federal
Russia. I'
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Federal Russia^ therefore, Irj accordance with the princ
iples laid down in Articles I and IV of this Treaty, declares
its refusal to participate in any action which misht destroy
its refusal to participate in a«y action which might destroy
or weaken Persian sovereignty. It regards as null and void
the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded by
the former Russian Government with third parties in respect
of Persia or to the detriment of that country
III, The two Gontradting Powers agree to accept and
respect the Husao-Persian frontleas, as drawn by the Frontier
Commission in 1881,
At the same time, inview of the repugnance which the
Russian Federal Government feels to enjoying the fruit of
the policy of usurpation of the Tsarist Government, it re
nounces all claim to the Achouradeh Islands and to the other
islands on the Astrabad Littoral* and restores to Persia the
village of FiroUzeh and the adjacent land ceded to Russia
in virtue of the convention of the 28th May, 1893.
The Persian Government agrees for its part that the
Russian Sarakhfi* or '*old** Sarakhs, and the land adjacent
to the Sarakhs River* shall be retained by Russia,
The two High Contracting Parties shall have equal rights
Of UGuage of thé Atrak River and the other frontier rivers
and waterways, In order finally to solve the question of the
waterways and all disputes concerning frontiers or territories*
a Commission* composed of Russian and Persian represent
atives shall be appointed.
IV, In consideration of the fact that each nation has
the rlfeht to determine freely its political destiny* each .
of the two Contracting Parties formally expressed its desire
to abstalh from any intervention in the internal affairs of
the other,
T. The tyo High Contracting Parties undertake—
1. To prhhlbit the formation or presence within their
respective territories of any organizations or groups of
persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known*
whose object Is to engage in acts of hostility aagainst
Persia or Russia* or against the allies of Russia,
T They will likewise prohibit the formation of troops or
armies within their respective territories with the afore
mentioned object.
Not to allow a third party or any organization* what
ever It %é )Called* which is hostile to the other Contracting
Party* tCK jlmport or to convey in transit across their countries
fiaaterial^'wMch can be used against the other Party,
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3. To prevent by all means In their power the presence
wlthirttholr territories or within the territories of their
allies of all armies or forces of a third party in cases
in which the presence of such forces would be regarded as
a menace to the frontiers, interests or safety of the other
Contracting Party*
YI* If a third party should attempt to tarry out a policy
of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or
if such Power should desire to use Persian territory as a
base of operations against Russia, or if a foreign Power
should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those
of its allies, and if the Persian Government should not be
able to put a stop to such menace after having been once
called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right
to advance her troops into the Persian Interior for the pur
poses of carrying out the military ope%*ations necessary
for its defence* Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her
troops from Persian territory as soon a,s the danger has been
removed.
VII. The considerations set forth in Article VI have
euual weight in the matter of the securitjr of the Caspian
Sea. The two High Contracting Parties therefore have agreed
tSat Federal Russia shall have the right to require the
Persian Government to send away foreign subjects, in the event
of their taking advantage of their engagement in the Persian
navy to undertake hostile action against Russia*
VIII. Federal Russia finally renounces the economic
policy pursued In the East by the Tsarist Government, which
consisted in lending money to the Persian Government, not
with a view to the economic development of the country, but
rather for purposes of political subjugation.
Federal Russia accordingly renounces Its rights In
respect of the loands granted to Persia by the Tsafiat Gov
ernment b . Jt regards the debts due to it as void, and -will
not require their repayment, Russia likewise renounces
its claims to the resources of Persia which were specified
as security for the loans in question,
IX* In view of the declaration by whch it has repudiated
the colonial and capitalist policy which occasioned so many
misfortunes and was the cause of so much bloodshed. Federal
Russia abandons the continuât!cm of the economic undertakings
of the Tsarist Government, the object of which was the economic
subjugation of Persia, Federal Russia therefore codes to the
PeralEin Government the full ownership of all funds and of all
real and, other property which the Russian Dlsco’jnt Bank
possesses on Persian territory, and likewise transfers to it
all the assets and liabilities of that bank. The Persian
Government nevertheless agrees that In the towns where it has
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been decldeà the Rub aIan Socialist Republic may establish
consulates^ Iand ,Where buildings exist belonging to the Dis
count Bank»! one'Of these buildings, to be chosen by the
Russian Government/' shall be placed at the dlspohal of the
Russian/Consulate, free of chajnge*
/'

/

Xj'^The Russian Federal Government, having abandoned the
colonial! policy,) which consisted In the construction of roads
and tel%raph line more in order to obtain military Influence
In other*! couàtrlés that for the purpose of developing their
civilizations,
belhg desirous of providing the Persian
people with thode means,of communication Indispensable for the
lndepep(ddnce
jdevelop^tenl of any nation, and also In order
to compei^ate the Persian people as far as possible for the
lossesilnjcurred by the,sojourn In its territory of:the Tsarist
armies/, #ede* free of charge to the Persian Government the
foilowlh^k’Russian Installations*
,' '
,/(a){A\e 'high-roads from Ehzeli to Tehran, and from
EatVln to Hamidan, end all land and Installations In con
nectIon.V 1th these roads,
^b/ The/railroad Djoulfa-Taurla-Soflan-Urmla, with all
Installctlond* rolling-stOGk, and accessories,
/(cl) The lahding-stages, warehouses, steamships, canals,
and 4ll/.i^eah0 of transport of the lake of Urmia.
All telegraph and telephone lines established In
Persia by the Tsarist Governments, with all movable and Immov
able/ l^stlal^ations and dependencies,
/ (é) Thie port of Enzell and thewarehouses, with the elect
trl6ai installation, and other buildings,
XÎ* In ;view of the fact that the Treaty of Turkomantch&l
oonolyded
the 10th February, 1828 (old style), between
Peralh and Rasala, which forbids Persia, under the terms of
Art idle
tt> have vessels in the waters of the Caspian Sea,
IS'abrogated/, In accordance with the principles set forth In
Article I olf the present Treaty, the two High Contracting
Parties ah^l enjoy equal rights of free navigation on that
sea, unde^ their own flags^ as from the date of the signing
of the present Treaty,
I'
> I1
^XIlL The Russian Federal Govemr^ent, having officially
renounoedj all economic Interests obtained by military pre
ponderance, further declares that,?».apart from the concessions
whl^h fojp the subject of Articles IX and X, the other con
cessions ’obtained by force by the Tsarist Government and its
subjects sh&ll also be regarded as null and void,
i

Î '

I-
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In conformity therewith the Russian Federal Government
restores^ as from the date of the sighing of the present
Treaty# to the Persian Government as representing the Persian
people, all the^ concessions in question, whether already
being worked or not, together with all land taken over In
vlrtjue Of those concessions.
Of the lands and properties situated In Persian and
bclCKjgins to the former Tsarist Government, only the pre
mises of the Russian Legation at Tehran and at Zerguendeh
with all movable and immovable appurtenances, as well as all
real and other property of the Couneulates and Vlce-Counoulates
shall be retained by Russia* Russia abandons, however, her
right to administer the village of Zorgundeh, which was
arrogated to itself by the former Tsarist Government.
XIII., The Persian Government, for its part, promised not
to cede toUa third Power, or to its subjects, the eoncesalons
and property restored to Persia by virtue of the present
Treaty^ and to maintain those rights for the Persian nation.
XIV. The Persian Government, recognising the importance
Of the Caspian fisheries for the food supply of Russia,
promises to conCi-Ude with the Food Service of the Russian
Socialist Federal Soviet Republic immediately unon the expiry
of the legal period of these existing engagements* a con
tract relating to the fisheries, containing appropriate
claused* Furthermore, the Persian Government promises to
examine, in agreement with the Government of the Russian
Sovlallst Federal Soviet Republic, the means of at once
conveyIhg the produce of the fisheries to the Food Service
of Soviet Russia pending the conclusion of the above contract*
X7* In accordance with the principle of liberty of con
science re-claimed by Soviet Russia, and with a desire to put
an end, in Moslem countries, to religious propaganda, the
real object of which was to exercise political influence
over the masses andthus to satisfy the rapacity of the Tsarist
Government, the Government of Soviet Russia declared that
the religious settlements established in Persia by the former
Tsarist Govera^ent^ are abolished* Soviet Russia will take
steps to prevent such missions from being sent to Persia in
the future*
Soviet Russia cedes unconditionally to the nation rep
resented by'the Persoan Government the lands, property and
buildings belonging to the Orthodix Mission situated at Urmia,
together with the other similar establishments. The Persian
Government shall.use these properties for the construction of
schools and other institutions intended for educational
purposes.

X60 —

X7I* By virtue of the communication from Soviet Russia
dated the 25th June, 19X9» with reference to the abolition
of consular jurisdictions, it la decided that Russian sub
jects in Persia and Persian subjects In Russia shall, as from
the date of the present Treaty, be placed upon the same
footing as the Inhabitants of the towns In which they reside;
they shall be subject to the laws of their country of residence,
and shall submit their complaints to the local Courts,
XTII, Persian subjects in Russia and î^ealan subjects
In Persia shall be exempt from military service and from
all military taxation,
XVIII, Persian subjects In Russian and Russian subjects
In Persia shall, as regards travel within the respective
countjties- enjoy the rights granted to the most favoured
nations other than countries aHled to them,
XIX, Within a short period after the signature of the
present Treaty, the two High Contracting Parties shall resume
commercial relations. The methods to be adopted for the
organisation of the import and export of goods, methods of
payment, and the customs duties to be levied by the Persian
Government on goods originating In Russia, shall be determined,
under a coramerdlal Convention, by a special Commission con
sisting of representatives of the two High. Contracting Parties,
XX, Each of the two High ContractIhg Parties grants
to the other the right of transit for the transport of goods
passing through Persia or Russia and consigned to a third
country.
The dues exacted in such cases shall not be higher than
those levied on the goods of the most favoured nations other
than countries allied to the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet
Republic,
The conditions of these relations 6hall be fixed by
a postal and telegraphic Convention,
XXII, In order to consolidate the good relations be
tween the two neiewflouring Powers and to facilitate the real
isation of the friendly intentions of each country towards
the other, each of the High Contracting Parties shall, immed
iately after the signature of the present Treaty, be represented
la the capital of the other by a Plenipotentiary Represent
ative, who shall enjoy the rights of extra-territoriality
and other privileges to which diplomatic representatives
are entitled by International law and usuage end by the
regulations and customs of the two countries.
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XXIII. In order to develop their mutual relations, the two
Hieh Contractins Parties shall establish Consulates in places
to be determined by coBBUon agreement..
The rights and duties of the O^^sula aliall be fixed
bj a special Agreement to be concluded without delay after
the signature of the present Treaty. This Agreement shall
conform to' the provisions inforce in the two countries with
regard to consular establishments.
XXIV. This Treaty shall be ratified within a period
of three-months. The exchange of ratlficaticHis shall take
place at Thhran as soon as possible.
'i'"
XXV,
The present Treaty is drawn up in Russian and
Persian^ Both texts shall be regarded as originals and
both shall be authentic,
I
*
xXvi. The present Treaty shall come into force imedlately
upon signature.
In faith whereof the undersigned have signed the present
Treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.
Bone at Moscow, February 26, 1921.

G. Chicherin
L* Karakhan
Kochaverol^Memalek

«
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TRI-PARTITS TREATY OF ALLIANCE

His Iraparlai Majesty the Shahinshah of iPan. on the
one hand^ and His Majesty the KlnK of Great Britain. Ireland,
and the British Dominions beyond the Seas. Emperor of Indla^
and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of
Soviet Socialist jRgouhlica on the other;
Havlnp; in view the principles of the Atlantic Charter
jointly agreed upon and announced to the world by the
President of the United Stated of America and the Prime
Minister of the United Elngdoa on 14 August 1941, end en
dorsed by the Government of the làilon of Soviet Sovlallat
Repûbllcs on? 24 September 1941, with which His Imperial
Majesty the Shahlnahah declares His complete agreement and
from which He wishes to benefit on an equal baSia with the
other nations of the world^ and
Belnr. anxious to strengthen the bonds of friendship and
mutual understanding between them, and
Considering that these bbjects will best be achieved
by the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance*
Have ^creed to conclude a treaty for this purpose and
have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries;
For His Imperial Majesty the Shahlnahah of Irani
His Excellency All Sohelly,
Minister of Foreign Affairs;
"For His Ma jeEty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and
the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India;
for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and I^orthem Ireland,
Sir Reader William Bullard, KCMG, CIE,
His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary In Iran»
For the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics;
His Excellency Andrei Andfeyevlch Smlmov,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Iran,
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Who having comaunioated their full powers, found in
good and due form, have agreed as followss
ARTICLE I
His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the
British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and
the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter
referred to as the Allied Powers) jointly and severally
undertake to respect the territorial integrity, the sove
reignty and political independence of Iran,
ARTICLE II
An Alliance la established between Jis Imperial Majesty
the Shahinshah of Iran on the one hand, and the Allied
Powers on the other*
ARTICLE III
(1) The Allied Powers jointly and severally undertake to
defend Iran by all means at their command from all aggression
on the part of Germany or any other Power.
(2) His Imperial ^lajesty the Shahinshah undertakes:
a) Tp co-operate with the Allied Powers with all the
means at his command and in every way possible in
order that they may be able to fulfil the above undertaking. The assistance of the Iranian forces shall,
however, be limited to the maintenance of internal
security on Iranian territory,
b) To secure to the Allied Powers for the passage of
troops or supplies fvota one Allied Power to the other,
or for other similar purposes, the unrestricted rifeht
to use, maintain, guard, and in case of military necessity,
control in any way that they may require, all the means
of conriiunlcation throughout Ire^, including railways,
roads, fivers, aerodromes, ports, pipelines and tele
phones, telegraph and wireless installations*
c) To furnish all possible assistance and facilities
in obtaining material and recruiting labour for the
purpose of the maintenance and the improvement of the
means of communications referred to in paragraph b).
d) To establish and maintain in collaboration with.the
Allied Powers such measures of censorship control as
they may require for all the means of communication
referred to in paragraph b),
(3) It is clearly understood that in the application of
paragraphs (2) b), c) and d) of the present article, the
Allied Powers will give full consideration to the essential
needs of Iran.
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ARTICLE 17
(1) The Allied Powers may maintain in Iranian territory
land* sea and air forces in such numlDer as they consider
necessary# The location of such forces shall be decided in
agreement with the Iranian Government so long as the strategic
situation allows* All questions Gcmceming the relation,
between the forces of the Allied Powers and the Iranian
authorities shall be settled, so far as possible, in co
operation with the Iranian authorities in such a way as
to safeguard the security of the said forces*
It is understood that the presence of these forces on
Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation
and will disturb as little as possible the administration
and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the
country, the normal movements of the population and the
application of Iranian laws and regulations*
(2) A separate agreement or agreements shall be concluded
as-soon as possible after the entry into force of the pre
sent Treaty regarding any financial obligations to be borne
by the Allied Powers under the provisions of the present
article and of paragpsfhe (2) b), o) and d) of article 3
above, in such matters .of local purchases,-the hiring of
buildings and plant, the employment of labour, transport
charges, etc, A special agreement shall be concluded
between the Allied Governmenta and ^he Imperial Iranian
Government defining the conditions of any transfers to the
Imperial Iranian Government after, the war of buildings and
other improvement effected by the Allied Powers on Iranian
territory. These agreements shall also settle the immunities
to be enjoyed by the Allied forces in Iran.
article

y

The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from
Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostil
ities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her Associates
have been suspended ;by the conclusion of an armistice or
armistices, or on |t&e conclusion of, peace between them,
whichever date is the earlier#
The expreeaioh "Associates* of Germany means all other
Powers which have engaged or may in 1future engage in hostil
ities against either of the Allied.iowefa.
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a r t ic l e

VI

(1) The Allied Powers undertake In their relations with
forelEh eountrlea not to adopt an attitude which la pre
judicial to the territorial integrity^ the sovereignty or
the political independence of Iran, nor to conclude treaties
inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty*
They undertake to consult the Government of His Imperial
Majesty the Shahinshah in all matters affecting the direct
Interests of Iran.
(2) His
adopt in
which is
treaties
Treaty.

Imperil Majesty the Shahinshah undertakes not to
his relations with foreign countries an attitude
inconsistent with the Alliance, nor to conclude
inconsistent with the provisions of the present
article

VII

The.^11led-lowers jointly undertake to use their best
endeavours to safeguard the economic existence of the Iranian
people against the privations and difficulties arising as a
result of the present war. On the entry into force of the
present Treaty, discussions shall be opened between the GoV-*
ernment of Iran and the Governments of the Allied Powers
as to the best possible methods of carrying out the above
undertaking.
ARTICLE VIII
The provisions of the present Treaty are equally binding
as bilateral obligations between His Imperial ^îajeaty the
Shahinshah and each of the two other High Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE IX
The present Treaty shall come into force on signature,
and eh^JLl remain in force until the date fixed for the
withdrawal of the forces of the Allied Powers from Iranian
territory in accordance with article V.
In witness whereof, the above-named Plenipotentiaries
have sighed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto
their seals.
Done at Tehran in triplicate in Persian, English and
Russian, all being equally authentic, on the twenty nlntî»
day of January one thousand nine hundred and forty two.
(signed) A, Sohelly
R.
Bullard
Andrei A. Smirnov
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TIÎS THRER-POfER DECLARATION CONCERHim

IMÏÏ
ISSUED a l ISE TEHRAN CONFERENCE

1 DECEIVE 194?
The President of the United States cf America^ the
Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and
the Prime Minister of the United Kinedom, having consulted
with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire
to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments
regarding their relations with Iran,
The Governments of the United States, the USSR and the
United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given
in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy,
particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies
from overseas to the Soviet Union*
The three Governments realize that war has causedi'spe6ial
economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that
they will continue to make available to the Government
of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having
regard to the heavy demanda made upon them by their world
wide military operations end to the world-wide shortage of
transport, raw materiela, and supplies for clvlllsn consumption*
With respect to the post-war period, the Governments
of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are
in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic
problems confronting Iran at the oloae of host H i t lea
should receive full conaideration, along with those of
other Members of the United Nations, by conferences o r
international agencies held or created to deal with inter
national economic matters.
The Governments of the l&iited States, the USSR and the
United Kingdom are at one with the Government oof Iran In
their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sover
eignty and territorial integrity of Iran, They count upon
the participation of Iran, together with all other peaceloving nations. In the establishment of international peace,
security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with
the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four
Governments have subscribed*
(signed) Winston Churchill
J.V. Stalin
Franklin D* Roosevelt

